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A Close Look at Three Court-Sponsored
ADR Programs: Why They Exist, How
They Operate, What They Deliver, and
Whether They Threaten Important Values
Wayne D. Brazilt
This article has two primary purposes. The first is to describe
in detail the history, operation and effects of the three most in-
tensely used alternative dispute resolution ("ADR") procedures
sponsored by the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California: settlement conferences hosted by magis-
trates, early neutral evaluation, and mandatory, nonbinding arbi-
tration.1 The second purpose is to consider whether these programs
pose serious threats to or actually trench upon important values.
The discussion of the three ADR programs is organized around
four questions: (1) why was the program established-that is, to
t Magistrate in the Northern District of California.
I would like to gratefully acknowledge several contributions to this article. As numerous
citations to their work will show, I have drawn heavily on the important research completed
by Professor David Levine of Hastings College of the' Law on early neutral evaluation, and
by Barbara Meierhoefer, Carroll Seron, E. Allan Lind and John E. Shapard of the Federal
Judicial Center, on arbitration programs sponsored by federal district courts. Statistical in-
formation about programs in the Northern District that is not attributed to a published
source has been developed for me by the dedicated professionals in the office of the Clerk of
Court, United States District Court for the Northern District of California, who monitor
aspects of civil case processing and who administer the early neutral evaluation and arbitra-
tion programs: Lee Derin, Keely Kirkpatrick, Martha Soeldner, Pauline Barr, Gloria
Acevedo and Becky Tatlonghari. James Gilmore, systems administrator in the Clerk's office,
has lent valuable computer support. As with so many projects, Lynn E. Lundstrom and
Jonathan D. Fernald, librarians in the District Court, have generously helped find important
resource material. My extern for the summer of 1989, Dawn D. Shirlaw, produced a very
helpful annotated bibliography of writings about the jury system. Finally, it is imperative to
acknowledge a fact that the discussion in the text may not make sufficiently clear: none of
the innovative programs sponsored by the Northern District would exist without the leader-
ship of former Chief Judge Robert F. Peckham, whose vision, open-mindedness and deep
concern for the people who use the courts serves as the foundation for all the work that is
described in these pages.
These are not the only ADR services that the Northern District provides. Other ser-
vices include nonbinding summary jury or bench trials, special masters (for settlement nego-
tiations or an array or pre- and post-trial purposes), and consent trials (jury or non-jury)
presided over by magistrates. All six of these special procedures are described in a pam-
phlet, entitled Dispute Resolution Procedures in the Northern District of California, that is
available from the clerk of the court.
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which needs was it designed to be responsive?; (2) what does the
program consist of?; (3) does it work-that is, does it achieve the
ends for which it was designed, and what do the lawyers and cli-
ents who have participated in the program think of it?; and (4) is
the program vulnerable to criticisms that have been voiced about
court-sponsored ADR programs generally? Because I will be dis-
cussing the same criticisms with respect to each of the three pro-
grams, it will be helpful to summarize briefly those criticisms here,
before beginning the detailed consideration of the alternative pro-
cedures themselves.
It is important to emphasize at the outset that the focus of
this article is on ADR procedures that are sponsored by courts, not
on ADR services that are designed and provided entirely within
the private sector. While there is some overlap, the concerns and
criticisms that attach to private and to court-sponsored ADR are
not the same. It also is important to acknowledge that I can speak
with confidence only about the programs in the Northern District
of California. Whether other programs, sponsored by other courts,
are more vulnerable to the criticisms I address here is a subject I
necessarily leave to other people.
It will facilitate my presentation to group the pertinent criti-
cisms of court-sponsored ADR programs into five categories, even
though doing so results in some strains in conceptual tidiness.2 The
first category involves fears that courts abdicate their judicial func-
Not all critics share identical concerns. Rather than parse each writing into categories
of criticism, what follows is a list of articles that raise, in the aggregate, most of the points to
which responses will be made in subsequent sections of this article. See, generally, James L.
Guill and Edward A. Slavin, Rush to Unfairness: The Downside of ADR, 28 Judges' J 8
(1989); Kevin C. McMunigal, The Costs of Settlement: The Impact of Scarcity of Adjudi-
cation on Litigating Lawyers, 37 UCLA L Rev 833 (1990); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settle-
ment, 93 Yale L J 1073 (1984); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 Harv L Rev 376
(1982); Marc Galanter, The Quality of Settlements, 1988 J Dispute Res 55; Edward Brunet,
Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 Tulane L Rev 1 (1987); Pe-
ter B. Edelman, Institutionalizing Dispute Resolution Alternatives, 9 Just Sys J 134 (1984);
Albert W. Alschuler, Mediation with a Mugger: The Shortage of Adjudicative Services and
the Need for a Two-Tier Trial System in Civil Cases, 99 Harv L Rev 1808 (1986); Dale A.
Oesterle, Dangers of Judge-Imposed Settlements, 9 Litigation 29 (1983); Linda I. Hay,
Carol M. Carnevale and Anthony V. Sinicropi, Professionalization: Selected Ethical Issues
in Dispute Resolution, 9 Just Sys J 228 (1984); and Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 Harv L Rev 668 (1986).
This Article does not address any Constitutional (Seventh Amendment) concerns about
the Northern District's court-sponsored ADR programs, in part because the results of each
process are not binding and right to trial de novo is preserved, and in part because Professor
Dwight Golann has devoted considerable scholarly attention to such concerns in his article,
Making Alternative Dispute Resolution Mandatory: The Constitutional Issues, 68 Or L
Rev 487 (1989).
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tion through ADR programs. Some critics have suggested, for ex-
ample, that courts set up ADR programs in order to make it more
difficult and more expensive for parties to get to trial. Under this
theory, lazy or overworked judges use ADR programs to intensify
the pressure on parties to settle before trial and thus to reduce the
judges' workloads. Another criticism in this category charges that
through ADR programs judges delegate their responsibilities to
private citizens who are not publicly screened or publicly accounta-
ble. The lack of meaningful screening and real accountability, the
argument runs, means that the risk of incompetence, bias or cor-
ruption is much greater with respect to these private neutrals than
it is with respect to judges.
A second group of criticisms is rooted in the fear that ADR is
promoted by people whose real objective is to reduce the role of
government in defining and enforcing the basic rules of the social
order. The concern is that ADR will be used to cut back the role of
the "public" in dispute resolution, so that "natural" social forces
and less-restrained competition can play larger roles in determin-
ing the character of our society and who gets what in it. Some
thoughtful commentators, like recent American Bar Association
president Robert Raven, worry that ADR programs will danger-
ously reduce pressure on legislatures to fund public courts at ade-
quate levels. Similarly, critics worry that court-sponsored ADR
programs will increase the likelihood that both the outcomes of
disputes, and the procedures used to achieve those outcomes, will
remain secret. Such increased "privatization" of dispute resolution
could, it is argued, deprive us of important sources of information
about what is happening in our society, impair the ability of simi-
larly situated people to perceive their rights, and imperil the law's
capacity to evolve and adapt to changing social conditions.
A third set of concerns revolves around the notions that ADR
programs are changing the traditional character of judicial institu-
tions and the role of judges. Some critics fear that, through ADR,
courts might use private lawyers who are serving as "neutrals" to
reach deeper into the disputing process than the public might per-
mit judges to reach directly, thus transforming the role of the neu-
tral (so that it approaches the continental European model) and
significantly changing the balance of power that exists between
parties in a traditional litigation environment. At another level,
critics fear that the establishment of ADR programs threatens to
convert courts into dispute resolution smorgasbords where large
percentages of the institution's resources are spent administering
ADR programs, leaving fewer resources for traditional adjudicatory
303]
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functions. Some worry that significant numbers of judges could be
converted into or replaced by ADR program administrators or
mediators.
The fourth set of criticisms builds from a fear that many
judges are biased against certain kinds of claims or claimants and
that such judges might vent these biases by shunting the categories
of disputes that they dislike out of the adjudicatory mainstream
and into ADR programs, perhaps thus discouraging the filing of
unpopular claims, but at least assuring that they receive fewer
public resources and less public attention than more favored kinds
of claims or claimants.
This fear is closely related to the fifth and arguably the most
important constellation of criticisms: that ADR procedures deliver
second-class justice. Defining "second-class" justice in this setting
turns out to be a most subtle and elusive task. Because construc-
tive thinking about this important idea requires considerable spec-
ificity, I will not address it here, in the abstract, but later, in the
context of specific factual information about each of the three pro-
grams covered in this article.
We turn now to a detailed consideration of judicially hosted
settlement conferences, early neutral evaluation, and mandatory,
nonbinding arbitration.
I. SETTLEMENT CONFERENCES HOSTED BY MAGISTRATES
A. Why Did the Court Establish A Program That Offers
Judicially Hosted Settlement Conferences?
Making judges or commissioners available for settlement con-
ferences is a well-established tradition in the metropolitan state
courts in northern California. This practice was not as well devel-
oped in the United States District Court prior to 1984, even
though one magistrate, the late Richard R. Goldsmith, hosted a
great many settlement negotiations in the late 1970s and early
1980s, and even though one of the district judges, Eugene F.
Lynch, brought with him a formidable reputation as a settlement
judge when he moved from state court to the federal bench in
1982.
Intensification of the federal court's commitment to settle-
ment work began evolving in late 1982, when the Honorable Rob-
ert F. Peckham, then Chief Judge of the Northern District of Cali-
fornia, appointed a task force and charged it with one overriding
responsibility: to determine if there were programs or procedures
that the court could adopt that would enable litigants to dispose of
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civil cases at substantially less cost. Chief Judge Peckham's princi-
pal concern was not about the court itself. His focus was not on the
size of the court's docket or on the cost to the taxpayers of sup-
porting the court. Instead, he was primarily concerned about how
expensive it had become for litigants to process their cases through
the formal adjudicatory system. Thus he asked the task force to
look for ways to save litigants money.
Judge Peckham appointed some 20 lawyers, representing a
wide variety of practices and perspectives, and one law professor,
who was to serve as reporter, to the task force. He also appointed a
committee of five judges to serve as a liaison between the task
force and the court. At its first meeting, the task force divided it-
self into four committees: one would explore the emerging world of
alternative dispute resolution in search of ideas that might be
adapted to court programs, one would re-examine the court's arbi-
tration program to determine whether it could be improved, one
would determine if there were ways to gather more useful statisti-
cal information about how the court and litigants were spending
their resources in civil matters, and one would study whether it
would be a wise policy to increase direct judicial participation in
the settlement process.
B. The Settlement Symposium
The "settlement committee" of the task force undertook two
major projects. One consisted of sponsoring an all-day symposium
on the topic of settlement, attended by some 75 members of the
bar (again representing a wide range of practices) and most of the
judges and magistrates of the court. The symposium was designed
to encourage a frank exchange of views about what roles, if any,
judges should play in the settlement arena. It was launched by a
series of speeches to the entire group of lawyers and judges, after
which the participants were divided into four working groups, each
of about 20 members. Each group discussed and debated a series of
topics that had been suggested by the task force. At the end of the
day, all participants in the symposium returned to the ceremonial
courtroom to review the ideas and insights generated in the work-
ing groups. This final session permitted participants to identify ar-
eas of consensus and areas of significant disagreement.
Consensus was clear on several points. Virtually all the law-
yers in attendance agreed that there was a need for greater uni-
formity and predictability in the way the judges of the court dealt
with settlement. An overwhelming majority expressed their belief
that in most civil cases the judges should become actively involved
303]
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in settlement matters and that, early in the pretrial period, they
should set in motion procedures that would prepare the cases ex-
peditiously for serious settlement negotiations. Most of the lawyers
favored a policy of making a judicially hosted settlement confer-
ence presumptively mandatory in most civil cases. Most of the law-
yers also felt that clients should be required to attend such confer-
ences unless it could be shown in a given case that enforcing this
requirement was not justified.
Significantly, most of the lawyers at the symposium felt
strongly that the judges should make much more meaningful use of
the initial status conferences mandated by Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 16. In particular, the lawyers felt that judges should
take the initiative to raise the subject of settlement at these early
pretrial conferences, thus relieving counsel of the fear of being per-
ceived by an opponent as having been "the first to blink," as one
participant phrased it. Moreover, the lawyers clearly indicated that
they wanted the judges not simply to ask tepidly about prospects
for settlement, or whether settlement had been considered, but to
pursue the matter actively and to work with counsel to set up a
discovery or motion practice plan that would posture the case as
efficiently as possible- for meaningful settlement negotiations, if
there were real informational obstacles to such negotiations at the
outset of the pretrial period. Many of the lawyers at the sympo-
sium also endorsed the notion that, as a general rule, the judicial
officer who hosted settlement negotiations should not be the judge
who was assigned to preside at trial, should the case reach that
stage.
C. The Survey of Lawyers' Views
While planning the symposium described above, the members
of the settlement committee, not wanting to make proposals to the
court that did not reflect the views of the bar generally, decided to
sponsor an opinion survey that would reach a large and diverse
group of attorneys who practiced in the Northern District of Cali-
fornia. With the active support of Chief Judge Peckham and of
attorney Theodore A. Kolb, the committee secured the financial
and administrative support of both the Lawyers Conference and
the National Conference of Federal Trial Judges of the Judicial
Administration Division of the ABA. With ABA sponsorship, the
committee was able to expand its survey so that the views of attor-
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neys in four different parts of the country could be explored.3 Be-
cause this paper focuses on the settlement program in the North-
ern District of California, for the most part I will limit my
discussion here to results from the polling of lawyers in that
jurisdiction.
The survey yielded completed questionnaires-most returned
by mail, some developed through telephone interviews-from
about 800 litigators from a wide range of practice situations in the
Northern District of California. Because the group of responding
attorneys was so large and so well balanced as between plaintiffs'
lawyers and defense counsel, and between lawyers who practiced in
small firms and those who practiced in large firms, the court had
considerable confidence that the views generated through the sur-
vey were truly representative of the litigating bar in the Northern
District.
The principal messages the bar sent to the court through the
responses to the questionnaire were. supported by dramatic majori-
ties and were consistent with the views expressed at the sympo-
sium. Ninety-two percent of the Northern District respondents
shared the view that involvement by federal judges in settlement
discussion was "likely to improve significantly the prospects for
achieving settlement." Eighty-seven percent endorsed the notion
that "a settlement conference hosted by a judge should be
mandatory in most cases in federal court." And 90 percent indi-
cated that they would "prefer a settlement judge who actively of-
fers suggestions and observations [to] one who simply facilitates
communication between the parties."4
The pattern of responses was not as dramatically one-sided
when the litigators were asked whether "involvement by federal
I Clerks of court in the Northern District of Florida, the Western District of Texas, the
Western District of Missouri, and the Northern District of California generated long lists of
attorneys who recently had made appearances. Then the American Bar Association funded
production, mailing and computer analysis of a substantial questionnaire that was sent to
hundreds of attorneys in each of the four participating jurisdictions. To make sure that
there were not significant differences between the views of the attorneys who returned the
mailed questionnaire and those who did not, researchers telephoned a random sampling of
attorneys from the latter group and asked them to answer the questions posed in the writ-
ten instrument. A' comparison of results revealed no significant differences between these
two groups. There were, however, significant differences of opinion between lawyers in dif-
ferent districts with respect to some of the questions. For a complete description of the
results from all four districts, see Wayne D. Brazil, Settling Civil Suits: Litigators' Views
About Appropriate Roles and Effective Techniques for Federal Judges (American Bar As-
sociation, 1985). For a focused summary of the results from all four districts, see Wayne D.
Brazil, What Lawyers Want from Judges in the Settlement Arena, 106 FRD 85 (1985).
Brazil, Settling Civil Suits at 137-42 (cited in note 3) (emphasis in original).
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judges in the settlement process significantly increase[s] the likeli-
hood that settlements will be fair to all concerned." Given the diffi-
culty of determining what the effect of judicial help would have
been in cases where none was provided, coupled with the elusive-
ness of the concept of "fairness," it is not surprising that 30 per-
cent of the California lawyers responding to this question indicated
that they were "not sure." But of the litigators who were confident
enough to venture a "yes" or "no" response, 78 percent opined that
involvement by a federal judge significantly increases the likeli-
hood that settlements will be fair.5 Thus there is substantial sup-
port in the bar for the view that judicial involvement in negotia-
tions can enhance the quality of settlement agreements. This data,
along with other results from the survey, helped persuade the
judges of the Northern District that active participation in settle-
ment negotiations is an important part of the service the court
should provide to the bar.
Responses to other questions helped the court determine what
form that service should take. For example, 71 percent of the
Northern District's litigators indicated that settlement conferences
are "significantly more likely to be productive if the clients are re-
quired to attend."6 In part as a result of that expression of opinion,
most judges of the court have adopted a policy requiring clients to
attend settlement conferences unless they reside more than 50
miles from the courthouse or can show why it would be unfair to
compel them to appear in person for the conference. Clients who
are not required to appear in person are almost always ordered to
be available by telephone during the negotiations.
The lawyers also indicated that in most cases they would pre-
fer that the host of their settlement negotiations not be the judge
who would preside at trial if the case could not be resolved consen-
sually. In cases where the finder of fact would be a judge, two-
thirds of the responding litigators took the position that it would
be "improper for the judge slated to preside at trial to become in-
volved in settlement discussions." Almost half (48 percent) held
the same view even in cases that would be tried to a jury. And 80
percent of the Northern District attorneys reported that they were
"likely to be more open in settlement discussions with a judge who
will not preside at trial than with the judge slated to preside at
trial." Similarly, 80 percent of the lawyers believed that the court
should "channel most settlement conference work to those judges
5 Id at 138.
6 Id.
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who are most successful as settlement facilitators. '7 Sensitive to
these views, the court developed a policy, reflected in Local Rule
240-1, that settlement conferences are to be hosted by a judge or
magistrate "other than the assigned judge unless all parties stipu-
late otherwise." Moreover, in order to develop a group of judicial
officers with special expertise in settlement work, and in order to
assure that the settlement host will not be the judge assigned for
trial, the court channels most settlement work to its full-time mag-
istrates, each of whom conducts scores of settlement conferences
annually.
The survey responses also made it abundantly clear that
Northern District attorneys want settlement judges to develop in-
dependent analyses of the cases and then to explain those analyses
in a series of private meetings with only one lawyer or one side
present at a time. In short, they want their judicial settlement host
to be analytically active; they do not want the judge simply to
serve as a vehicle by which parties exchange offers and demands.
These preferences by the local bar have played a major role in
shaping the settlement program the court now offers.
D. What Is the Northern District's Settlement Program?
The content of the court's settlement program, as it has
evolved over the past several years, is very largely responsive to the
desires of the bar as expressed during the settlement symposium
and through the survey. While the program is the least formally
defined of the three ADR procedures that are sponsored by the
court," it is substantial and robust. The court is committed to pro-
viding a judicial host for settlement negotiations in every civil ac-
tion where a request is made. Moreover, even when no request is
made, many of the judges of our court will order counsel to attend
a settlement conference hosted by a magistrate. The range of prac-
tices among the judges in this regard is considerable: some order
settlement conferences in a substantial percentage of their cases,
' Id at 138-40.
' The settlement program is not the subject of a General Order and the only paragraph
in the Local Rules that relates to the program gives no real sense of how it operates. Local
Rule 240-1 provides that any party may request a judicially hosted settlement conference
and that if such a request is granted the conference shall not be hosted by the judge who
would preside at trial unless all parties so stipulate. The same rule permits parties to submit
written settlement conference statements directly to the host of their negotiations (and not
to file them), thus preserving a measure of confidentiality. The only other provision of the
rule requires each party to be represented at such a conference by a lawyer "authorized to
participate in settlement negotiations." ND Cal LR 240-1.
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others rarely do. While precise figures are not available, it appears
that at least one judicially hosted settlement conference is held in
about 40 percent of the kinds of civil cases that generate the vast
majority of the court's work and in which issues are joined on the
merits.9 The six full-time magistrates host some 750 to 800 settle-
ment conferences per year. And while a few of the district judges
devote significant time to hosting settlement negotiations, most of
the work the court does in this arena is performed by magistrates.
Thus, the court hosts about 900 settlement conferences per year,
the vast majority of which are not conducted by the judge assigned
to preside at trial. Perhaps 20 percent of these are follow-up ses-
sions-the second or third settlement conference in the same case.
What the judicially-hosted settlement conference consists of
can vary substantially from case to case and among the judges and
magistrates. Most such conferences, however, have a common core,
which consists of the judicial officer meeting first with all the law-
yers and parties in a group and discussing the procedures that will
be used in the negotiations. Sometimes in these initial group ses-
sions the 'judicial host and counsel discuss, at least in general
terms, the merits of the case. Thereafter, it is common for the
judge to meet privately with one lawyer at a time in order to ex-
plore the evidence and the party's posture toward settlement in
greater depth. The process usually is dialectical, with the host both
facilitating the exchange of views between the parties and offering
his or her own analysis and opinions. The judicial officer has no
power, and is prohibited, by unwritten local convention, from com-
municating with the assigned judge about what transpired in the
negotiations, except to the extent of reporting whether the case
settled or whether follow-up sessions are contemplated. Thus, if
settlement is reached, it is not because of pressure imposed by the
host, but because the parties' analyses of their situations and per-
ceptions of their own best interests, considered in the context of
the judicial host's views, have led them to conclude that terms that
are available are acceptable.
The role played by clients in judicially hosted settlement con-
ferences also varies from case to case and from host to host. As
noted earlier, many judges routinely order clients who live or work
less than 50 miles from the courthouse to be present in the build-
' In estimating this percentage, I did not take into account routine government collec-
tion cases, reviews, of administrative determinations, prisoner petitions, forfeiture/penalty
matters, bankruptcy actions, social security actions, tax suits, or actions under specialized
statutes, for example, agricultural acts or the energy allocation act.
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ing when the conference is taking place. Most judges require cli-
ents to be available on telephone standby, so they can respond to
offers or demands or to other developments during the conference.
Even in those conferences where the client is present in the build-
ing, however, it is unusual for the client to participate directly in
the negotiations to the same extent as his or her lawyer. When the
judges hold the one-on-one sessions with counsel, usually the cli-
ents do not participate-at least until after the first round of pri-
vate sessions have been concluded. Occasionally, however, clients
participate fully in every dimension of the process. More com-
monly, but still probably in appreciably less than half of the con-
ferences, the judicial host involves the clients directly in the dis-
cussions after the first round or two of private seriatim discussions
with the lawyers. When the clients are invited to participate di-
rectly, the purpose usually is to get information from them-for
example, about events underlying the case-to explore factors that
might affect terms of settlement but that are unrelated to the mer-
its of the case-for example, business or "political" considera-
tions-or to give the magistrate an opportunity to share directly
with them his or her views about the case or possible settlement
proposals.
E. Do the Judicially Hosted Settlement Conferences "Work"?
As the discussion in the next section will help demonstrate,
determining how to go about answering this deceptively simple
question is a subtle and complex task. One obvious but inadequate
measure of whether a program like this "works" is whether the
program increases the settlement rate. Are settlements reached in
a higher percentage of cases because of this program than they
would be without it? It is embarrassing to admit that we do not
know. The systems for preserving data about case histories that
have been developed by the Administrative Office of the United
States courts and by the clerk's office in the Northern District sim-
ply do not include the information that is necessary to determine
whether the settlement program has an overall positive effect on
the settlement rate. And while common sense would suggest that
the commitment of judicial resources to this process would result
in more settlements, the limited empirical work that has been done
on this subject in other courts has not demonstrated this result."l
'o See discussion of empirical research in Brazil, Settling Civil Suits at 8-14 (cited in
note 3).
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There are several other values, however, by which to assess
whether a program like this "works." The commitment of judicial
resources might make settlements occur earlier .in the pretrial pe-
riod than they otherwise would. Since many lawyers seem to fear
being the first to raise the question of settlement, judicial interven-
tion might cause serious negotiations to commence earlier than
they otherwise would. Judicial settlement conferences also might
enable parties to reach agreements, with an expenditure of fewer
resources; for example, the conferences might have a crucible effect
that encourages parties to make decisions in fewer negotiations
than otherwise would be required. Judicial participation in settle-
ment negotiations also might improve the quality both of the pro-
cess-thinking, communicating, and bargaining-and of the prod-
ucts that emerge from it, for example, the fairness of the terms and
the likelihood that parties will abide by them. Judges or magis-
trates who host settlement negotiations can help improve the qual-
ity of communication across party lines, the quality of the parties'
analysis of the case, and the breadth and creativity of their think-
ing about solution options. These and other ways in which judicial
participation can contribute to the quality and efficiency of the
settlement dynamic will be discussed in the next section.
F. How Does the Northern District's Settlement Program
Measure Up against Criticisms of C6urt-Sponsored ADR?
1. Does the Settlement Program Represent an Abdication of
the Judicial Function?
Since judicial officers, primarily magistrates, serve as the
"neutrals" in this program, it is not clear how one could argue that
the court's settlement work represents an abdication of the judicial
function. There is no evidence that the local bar would prefer mag-
istrates to preside over trials or to perform other formal adjudica-
tory duties. While in theory magistrates could devote to trial work
the time they are now devoting to settlement, cases may be tried to
a magistrate only with the consent of all parties, and, to date, liti-
gants have not filled the magistrate's dockets with consent cases.
Given the great demand by the bar on the magistrates for help
with settlement negotiations, and the relatively small percentage of
cases where all parties consent to magistrate's jurisdiction for trial,
there is no reason to conclude that the settlement conference pro-
gram represents a wasteful diversion of precious judicial resources
out of the formal adjudicatory mode.
Moreover, the Northern District's settlement program was not
intended to serve as a barrier to trial or as a vehicle for pressuring
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litigants .to settle. Rather, as the history of the program's develop-
ment shows, it was built in response to the wishes of the bar and is
designed to provide litigants with a tool for exploring settlement
possibilities more carefully than they otherwise might. One very
significant fact that contradicts the suggestion that the court
would set up a settlement conference program to serve as a barrier
to trial should be emphasized here: as the judges of this court are
quite well aware, only a tiny percentage of cases reach the trial
stage, and the vast majority will settle whether the judiciary helps
with the process or not. 1 Knowing these basic facts of litigation
life, it would make no sense for a court that wanted to use settle-
ment conferences as barriers to trial to provide for them in
upwards of half of its cases. Such a commitment of precious judi-
cial resources would be wholly unnecessary for that purpose.
Moreover, most settlement conferences impose relatively little
expense on the litigants; the principal expense, in the normal case,
would, be a lawyer's time of about four hours: two to prepare and
two to participate. In addition, there is absolutely no penalty, fi-
nancial or procedural, imposed on any party for refusing to settle
and demanding a trial.
Because most of the settlement work is done not by judges,
but by magistrates who have no power over disposition and who
are prohibited from disclosing to the judge the substance of any
communication made during settlement negotiations, there is little
risk that the judicial host of the settlement conference could coerce
parties into agreeing to terms that they otherwise would not ac-
cept. In settlement conferences, magistrates possess only such in-
formal powers as might be associated with the judicial office, and I
have never heard of a magistrate in the Northern District attempt-
ing to use such informal power to coerce a litigant or lawyer into
accepting a settlement.
While the judge who would preside at trial certainly would be
in a position to impose pressures on parties during settlement ne-
gotiations, the local rule's provision that the assigned judge may
conduct a settlement- conference only with the consent of all the
parties reduces dramatically the likelihood that trial judges would
abuse the power they might have in this arena. And while stories
may circulate about judges ordering counsel to stay at the bargain-
ing table for hours, attempting simply to exhaust parties into com-
promising, in the six years I have been a magistrate I do not know
1 Galanter, 1988 J Dispute Res at 56 (cited in note 2).
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of a single instance of this kind of tactic being used by a magis-
trate or judge of this court.12 All the settlement conferences I have
seen have lasted only as long as the parties have seemed interested
in continuing the process. In fact, because the magistrates of this
court host so many settlement conferences, the pressure really cuts
in the opposite direction: we often feel that we do not have as
much time to help counsel with settlement as they would like. Oc-
casionally we must turn away parties who want settlement confer-
ences, or follow-up sessions, simply because the other demands on
our time leave us with no choice. Thus, rather than settlement con-
ferences being imposed as roadblocks in the march toward trial,
they are a service provided by the court in response to a demand
by the bar that cannot be fully satisfied.
2. Is the Underlying Purpose of the Settlement Program to
Reduce Governmental Involvement in Defining and Enforcing the
Basic Rules of the Social Order?
This concern would be triggered by the settlement program if
its principal purpose and effect were to increase significantly the
overall settlement rate and thus to reduce appreciably the oppor-
tunities for judges and juries to contribute to the evolution of legal
norms, to determine what the facts underlying given disputes are,
and to apply the relevant norms to those facts. I am aware of no
evidence, however, that the court's settlement program has a sig-
nificant impact on overall settlement rates or that it is maintained
in the hope that it will have such an effect. Even if the settlement
program increased the overall settlement rate substantially, how-
ever, a rather large philosophical question would remain: assuming
that the settlements were truly voluntary, should government re-
fuse to facilitate them, against the wishes of the parties, so as to
preserve a given level of "public" participation in the dispute reso-
lution process? This is a serious question that is anything' but self-
answering. Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of this paper to
assay all the issues raised here in a meaningful way.
There are at least two points, however, that should be made in
response to this concern. One is that a substantial percentage of
the cases in which a judge or magistrate participates in settlement
negotiations do not involve novel legal questions and do not raise
2 Of course, I do not have information about every judicially hosted settlement confer-
ence in this court. I also acknowledge a few reports, none of which I have attempted to
verify, about judges who no longer carry fill case loads, attempting in the past to at least
indirectly pressure lawyers into adopting more flexible postures toward settlement.
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significant issues of public policy. Much of the litigation in our
court is about only one thing: money. Much of it pits two commer-
cial entities against one another. And a very significant percentage
of the cases turn in large measure on factual issues that are not of
any general significance, but are unique to the individual disputes.
It is not obvious that it is important to encourage a high level of
public participation in the resolution of disputes of this kind.
There are, of course, other kinds of cases that clearly implicate
important societal values, that raise issues of considerable public
moment, or that involve issues of fact that could affect the lives of
a great many people. Court policies that promoted secret resolu-
tion of large percentages of such cases would cause concern. But I
know of no evidence that our court's settlement program has the
effect of increasing the percentage of such cases that are termi-
nated by confidential settlement agreements.
Nor is there any necessary connection between the act of set-
tlement and confidentiality. The fact that the court helps parties
to reach settlement agreements does not mean that the court also
encourages parties to keep the terms of such agreements confiden-
tial. Parties are free to decide for themselves whether to keep the
terms of their deals secret. I know of no evidence that the judges
or magistrates of our court pressure or try to persuade parties to
keep settlement terms confidential. Moreover, many of the cases
that implicate socially significant values, or that affect the interests
of large numbers of people, are prosecuted in forms, like class ac-
tions, that require court approval of settlement agreements after a
public debate about the appropriateness of their terms.
The second major point that needs to be made here is that
overall settlement rates probably would remain about the same if
there were no judicial participation in the process, even for cases
that involve socially important issues. So the choice, realistically, is
not between judicially assisted settlements and full public trials,
but between judicially assisted settlements and settlements
reached without judicial help. If those are the real alternatives in
the vast majority of cases, then a significant commitment of judi-
cial resources to the settlement process represents a greater rather
than a lesser involvement by the public in the process by which
disputes are resolved and in the enforcement of the basic rules of
our society. There is no "public" involvement in or influence over
settlements that are reached as-a result of negotiations in which
only private litigants are involved. In a judicially hosted settlement
conference, by contrast, there is at least an opportunity for a judge
or magistrate to make dispassionate contributions to the analysis
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of the parties' situations and to encourage the litigants to consider
social values and the implications for others of their settlement
decisions.
Does the settlement program reduce pressure on legislatures
to fund public courts at adequate levels? This concern appears to
be triggered primarily by programs in which the role of the neutral
is played by private attorneys or by retired judges, and thus does
not seem especially significant with respect to judicially hosted set-
tlement conferences. The fact that the Northern District uses mag-
istrates, however, instead of Article III judges, to perform the vast
majority of the settlement work may give rise to some concerns
about levels of public funding for "full" judges. It is clear that a
magistrate is less expensive than a judge to maintain, and that one
reason Congress has turned relatively enthusiastically to the mag-
istrate system is to save the taxpayers' money. But the use of less
prestigious judicial officers to perform settlement work seems sub-
stantially less threatening than the use of such officers to perform
adjudicatory functions. In contrast to adjudicatory functions,
which must be performed, settlement services are essentially gratu-
itous. Having magistrates perform a service that leaves intact all of
the courts' obligations in the formal adjudicatory arena is not
likely to relieve significantly pressure on the legislature to main-
tain the adjudicatory machinery at an appropriate level. And if less
prestigious, and less expensive, judicial officers were to succeed in
increasing the overall settlement rate, the real need for public sup-
port of formal adjudicatory processes would decrease.
3. Is the Settlement Program Changing the Role of Judges
or the Character of the Court?
Is the settlement program changing the role of the judge from
passive/reactive referee to active participant or even dominant
player in the dispute resolution process? It is arguable that the
image of the "passive/reactive referee" has not fit the reality of
federal judicial behavior for some time, and that increased involve-
ment in settlement work is a relatively recent extension of a trend
toward activism that began decades ago and that was inspired by a
myriad of forces, not the least of which were increasing docket
pressures accompanied by decreasing legislative support for the ju-
dicial branch. For reasons wholly independent of any interest in
settlement, federal judges have been encouraged for quite some
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time to become active "case managers,"' 3 and thus to become more
significant forces in the unfolding of the litigation drama. It is also
arguable, of course, that the trend toward judicial activism in trial
courts is unhealthy, but it does not seem true that settlement pro-
grams of the kind sponsored in the Northern District are a cause of
a broad transformation of the judicial role.
Nor can it be said that the court's settlement program is
changing the role of the judge into the dominating player in the
dispute resolution game. Since the vast majority of the settlement
work is performed by magistrates who have no case-dispositive
powers, in most settlement conferences in our court the judicial
host has virtually no power to abuse. Moreover, the magistrates
uniformly avoid any appearance of trying to coerce litigants into
accepting any proposed terms; instead, the principal means by
which the magistrates facilitate negotiations is by helping the law-
yers analyze their clients' situations and by improving lines of
communication between adversaries.
It also is significant that the Northern District's settlement
program is much more the product of responsiveness to demands
by lawyers and litigants than of initiatives undertaken by the
judges themselves. As pointed out above, the court's decision to
increase substantially its commitment to settlement work was di-
rectly inspired by the results of the symposium that the court
sponsored and of the ABA survey of lawyer preferences. And even
though 87 percent of the 800 lawyers polled in Northern California
believe that a judicially hosted. settlement conference should be
mandatory in most cases in federal court, our judges have declined
to adopt a rule that would compel such conferences in all cases, or
even in all cases that fall into specified categories.
Finally, it is important to point out that, by assigning most of
the settlement work to magistrates; the court has preserved the ca-
pacity of its Article III judges to continue to commit the vast ma-
jority of their resources to traditional adjudicative work-motions
and trials-and to case management. So the changes in the judicial
role have taken place primarily among the ranks of the magis-
trates, not among the judges, and since there are more than twice
See, for example, Alvin B. Rubin, The Managed Calendar: Some Pragmatic Sugges-
tions About Achieving the Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in
Federal Courts, 4 Just Sys J 135 (1978); William W Schwarzer, Managing Civil Litigation:
The Trial Judge's Role, 61 Judicature 400 (1978); William W Schwarzer, Managing Anti-
trust and Other Complex Litigation: A Handbook for Lawyers and Judges (Michie, 1982);
and Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding
a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 Cal L Rev 770 (1981).
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as many judges as magistrates, it cannot be fairly said that the
settlement program is changing the character of the court as an
institution.
If the work of the magistrates is included in the calculation,
there has been an increase in the amount of judicial resources de-
voted to settlement and a change in the nature of the judicial role
toward more analytical activism. Again, however, that change in
our court is in large measure a result of the court trying to provide
the kind of service that the bar has sought. The ABA survey
showed that 90 percent of Northern District litigators "prefer a
settlement judge who actively offers suggestions and observations
[to] one who simply facilitates communication between the par-
ties." Moreover, when asked to characterize the most successful
settlement facilitator that they had encountered, more of the sur-
veyed lawyers cited the judge's "willingness to express an opinion"
or to offer an analysis of the case than any other factor. It is to
these mandates that the court has responded in evolving its settle-
ment program.
4. Is There Bias or Discrimination in Determining Which
Cases Are Sent to Settlement Conferences?
The judges of this court strive to provide a judicial host for a
settlement conference in every case where a request is made, re-
gardless of subject matter or size. I am not aware of any evidence
that the court is more likely to compel certain kinds of cases to
participate in settlement conferences. The magistrates host settle-
ment conferences in every type of case on the court's docket, from
civil rights to RICO. I have detected no bias in favor of or against
any class of case. Nor do I know of any reason to believe that a
disproportionate percentage of any kind of case is compelled to
participate in the settlement program.'4
Certainly the court has comparably strong incentives to en-
courage settlement in both large and small cases. The incentive to
help large cases reach settlement is obvious: trying them consumes
painful percentages of the court's resources. The incentives to help
small cases reach settlement are less obvious, but, in my view, no
less real: judges have a strong sense that to go through the entire
" Unfortunately, the recordkeeping systems established by the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts do not yield statistics that would show the percentage of cases, by
subject matter or type of claimant, in which a settlement conference is conducted. Thus, I
must rely on personal experience and impressions of work done by other judicial officers to
rebut the suggestion that bias against certain kinds of cases or claimants infects determina-
tions about which cases are assigned to the settlement program.
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pretrial ritual-discovery, motions, pretrial conferences-in a
small case, and to litigate it to judgment, often wastes the re-
sources of both the litigants and the court. In cases where the only
significant interest involved is money, and such cases represent a
very substantial portion of this court's docket, judges want eco-
nomic common sense to play a major role in the disposition. At
least in cases where the amount realistically in controversy is not
large, economic common sense often requires resolution by settle-
ment rather than by full adjudication, which involves such huge
transaction costs. Moreover, trying a small case that involves only
money offers a judge much less of the sense of drama and impor-
tance that can attend presiding at the trial of a large matter. This
factor tends in some measure to counterbalance the incentive that
derives from the huge consumption of resources that a long trial
entails to encourage the parties to a large case to settle. Thus, for
different reasons, the court has a substantial incentive to provide
settlement conference services to both large and small cases.
Given the character of the settlement conferences hosted by
magistrates in this court, it is not likely that if a judge Were biased
against a particular type of claim or claimant, for example, civil
rights-claims or pro se claimants, that he or she would give vent to
that bias by compelling the parties to participate in a judicially
hosted settlement conference. Such fears build on an assumption
that is misplaced. The assumption is that settlement conferences
are perceived as wasteful burdens rather than important services.
In fact, as the results of the ABA survey showed, most lawyers
greet settlement conferences gratefully and with open arms. Thus,
in most cases, "compelling" counsel to participate in a settlement
conference hardly represents a form of punishment. Moreover,
magistrate-hosted conferences are not in terrorem events. They are
informal and relatively low-stress sessions, almost always lasting
only as long as the parties evince some interest in continuing them.
Moreover, cases that might be perceived as difficult to try, for ex-
ample, cases involving parties proceeding in pro se, probably are
also perceived as difficult to settle, thus reducing the incentive the
court might feel to expend valuable institutional resources on the
settlement process. In sum, the fear that judicial bias might result
in some kinds of cases being either benefitted or harmed by the
settlement conference program seems unfounded.
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5. Does the Court's Settlement Program Deliver Second-
Class Justice?
To consider this question thoughtfully we must make two sep-
arate comparisons: the first between judicially hosted settlement
conferences and trials, and the second between judicially hosted
settlement conferences and private settlement negotiations that in-
volve only counsel for the parties. Since many more civil cases are
resolved by private settlement than by trial, the latter of these two
comparisons will be the more significant.
In making the comparison between judicially hosted settle-
ment conferences and trials, we must subdivide our inquiry yet an-
other time so that we focus separately on (1) jury trials and (2)
trials in which a judge is the finder of fact. There is a massive
amount of literature about civil juries, some relatively flattering,
some not. This is not the place to attempt either a systematic re-
view or an independent analysis of that literature. For present pur-
poses it will suffice to note that there is not insubstantial support
for the view that in some juries the deliberative process is some-
thing less than tightly rational and that results reached by differ-
ent juries in at least arguably similar cases can vary widely. There
also is significant evidence that confidence among lawyers in the
quality of the deliberative process by juries is quite low."5 There
are, of course, weighty political values that support retention of the
jury system, but some observers would not list among those values
rationality of deliberative process, reliability, and predictability of
result. Thus, when we consider whether judicially facilitated settle-
ment is "second class" in comparison to jury trials, we must ac-
knowledge that there is some possibility that at least some of the
time there are serious shortfalls in the rationality of the process by
which juries reach verdicts.
For some litigants, two very important measures of the value
of any dispute resolution process are the extent to which it (1) per-
mits catharsis, or ventilation of feelings in the direction of an ad-
versary, and (2) creates an opportunity for public vindication. In
most circumstances a jury trial delivers more of each of these val-
ues than does a judicially hosted settlement process. It is worth
noting, however, that settlement procedures are not necessarily in-
capable of servicing these values. In many of the settlement confer-
ences I host, I meet in private with the parties individually, almost
always accompanied by their counsel. Often, one purpose of such
,5 See, for example, Barbara Meierhoefer and Carroll Seron, Court-Annexed Arbitra-
tion in the Northern District of California 22-23 (Federal Judicial Center, 1988).
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meetings is to give the parties a chance to tell their side of the
story to a neutral representative of the public. While not the same
as a full public airing of their views, such sessions can offer two
advantages to parties that are not usually attainable in jury trials.
One is that they can tell their story in a substantially less con-
strained and intimidating environment than a public courtroom,
where the rules of evidence and the other rigidities of trial proce-
dure can significantly compromise their freedom to speak. In sharp
contrast, my conversations with clients in settlement negotiations
take place in chambers; I wear neither robes nor suit jacket; we sit
at the same table, in the same kinds of chairs; and I permit them
to make narrative presentations that include matters wholly inad-
missible under the rules of evidence.
The second significant difference for clients is that my settle-
ment procedure offers them an opportunity for direct, forthright,
dialectical feedback on their stories, a kind of feedback that has no
equivalent in a jury trial. After listening to clients tell their side of
the story, I often ask questions to explicate matters left uncovered
or to expose different perspectives from which the same matters
might be considered. I also offer comments on and reactions to the
stories they have told. Sometimes part of my reaction is supportive
and sympathetic. Sometimes part of my reaction is skeptical. After
hearing my reactions and responding to my questions, parties often
have an opportunity to ask questions of me and to make additional
comments of their own. The process is informal, conversational,
and dialectic. It sometimes includes discussion of rules of law and
evidence as well, the goal being to maximize the party's under-
standing of the factors that affect his or her case and that might
play roles in the settlement decision. I believe that many clients
appreciate this kind of opportunity for catharsis and dialectical-
feedback from a neutral representative of the public. A jury trial
would present them with a much different, more constrained, less
analytically rich opportunity for self-expression.
Comparing a judicially facilitated settlement to a bench trial
presents a different set of problems. When we consider the ques-
tion of whether judicially facilitated settlement negotiations re-
present a "second-class" form of justice in comparison with bench
trials, we should focus separately on "process" issues and "prod-
uct" issues.
I consider first process issues. While judges are by no means
immune to criticisms for political bias, laziness, and shortfalls of
intelligence or knowledge, there appears to be substantially less
concern about unpredictability, irrationality and unreliability in
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bench trials than in jury trials.16 For present purposes, I will pro-
ceed on the assumption that the deliberative process in most bench
trials is pretty much as careful, rational and neutral as a non-
specialized human institution is likely to produce. Moreover, the
process by which information is presented to the decisionmaker in
bench trials is more systematic and more thorough than the pro-
cess in settlement conferences. Furthermore, settlement confer-
ences provide very limited means for assessing the credibility of
percipient witnesses and only modest means for testing the details
of the reasoning process that supports the views of expert wit-
nesses. Even though this limitation is not inherent in the settle-
ment process, I only occasionally have an opportunity in settle-
ment conferences to question, in private, key percipient or expert
witnesses and to compare their persuasive power. Thus, in the nor-
mal course, the bench trial is likely to present a significantly richer
and more reliable data base than a settlement conference. On the
other hand, many settlement conferences are preceded by substan-
tial discovery, in which counsel have explored the arguably rele-
vant evidence, including testimony by percipient and expert wit-
nesses, at much greater length than they could at trial. At least in
some instances it may be that lawyers in settlement conferences
have an even better information base for making rational assess-
ments of legal merits of the case than would a judge at a bench
trial.
Even more important, settlement conferences permit the deci-
sionmakers to explore considerations and evaluate materials that
would not be admissible at a bench trial on relevance or other
grounds. 17 Such considerations or materials might be very impor-
tant, in the eyes of the parties and counsel, to fashioning a fair or
sensible solution to a particular dispute, even though they have lit-
tle or nothing to do with its legal merits. For example, a party's
arguable breach of a contract may have been caused by cash flow
problems that also raise the specter of bankruptcy. Such problems
may persuade both sides that the fairest and most productive solu-
tion to their dispute would involve restructuring their business re-
lationship, arranging for short-term infusions of capital, and ex-
tending the period in which the original contractual obligations
could be satisfied.
16 Id.
See, for example, Galanter, 1988 J Dispute Res at 58 (cited in note 2), discussing
Melvin A. Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation: Dispute-Settlement and
Rulemaking, 89 Harv L Rev 637, 655-57 (1976).
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This example suggests another respect in which settlement
can be superior to trial. If we focus on "product" rather than "pro-
cess," the advantages of settlement loom larger. Simply stated, the
range of solution options is much greater in a settlement process
than in a trial. In most cases a judge has very little room for crea-
tivity when issuing a judgment. Most judgments simply announce
who won and how much money, if any, will change hands. In sharp
contrast, there is a wide range of "products" that can emerge from
settlement processes. Even in simple cases, settlements might in-
clude structured payouts over time, new contractual relations (for
example, terms of insurance), or new jobs for plaintiffs. And in
more complex cases, or in cases where the relations between the
parties outside the litigation could have many dimensions, there
are almost innumerable potential components of settlement con-
tracts. Joint ventures can be formed, product lines reshaped, li-
censes granted, payments made through shares of stock or future
business, press releases drafted and public relations campaigns
launched, and so on.
Are imbalances between the skills and resources of litigants
and lawyers more likely to distort processes or results in judicially
hosted settlement negotiations than in trials? The answer to this
difficult question is likely to remain elusive. Moreover, the answer
may well not be the same for jury trials and bench trials. In bench
trials, at least in federal court, judges are likely to be relatively
active, both in containing excesses by counsel and in probing for
relevant data that the parties' presentations might leave obscure.
Such judicial activism, which can in some measure compensate for
imbalances between the resources of counsel or litigants, is likely
to be less pronounced in jury trials. It also is arguable that jurors
are more vulnerable to manipulation or deception by.artful lawyers
than are judges.
When we shift focus to judicially facilitated settlements, we
find it difficult to generalize because there is a huge range of be-
havior relevant to this issue by judicial hosts of settlement negotia-
tions. Some magistrates and judges remain relatively passive in
settlement negotiations and permit a great deal of direct interac-
tion between opposing counsel. There is a greater risk that imbal-
ances between the skills and resources of counsel or litigants will
distort the rationality and fairness of the process in such settings
than in conferences where the judge plays an analytically assertive
and independent role and requires most of the communication
across party lines to be made indirectly, through the host of the
conference. An analytically active judge is more likely than his or
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her passive counterpart to prevent abuses of power. For example,
by offering frank, thoughtful comments about the strengths and
weaknesses of competing positions, an active settlement host may
in some measure protect an outgunned party or lawyer. The articu-
lation by judges of independent opinions about the fairness or wis-
dom of proposed terms of settlement may have a similar effect.
But settlement hosts often may be reluctant to articulate such
views. Moreover, in forming such opinions, judges and magistrates
who participate in settlement negotiations often rely heavily on
what the lawyers tell them about the nature of the evidence and
other real-world factors that could affect the settlement value of
the case, for example, the financial situations of the parties. Such
extensive reliance might compromise the independence of the judi-
cial host's opinions and render the negotiation process vulnerable
to abuse by the more artful lawyer. Given all of these considera-
tions, my guess would be that the danger that imbalances in lawyer
or litigant skills or resources will distort results is smaller in bench
trials than in either jury trials or judicially hosted settlement con-
ferences. As between jury trials and settlement conferences, how-
ever, it simply is not clear where this particular threat to the qual-
ity of dispute resolution is greater.
Results of comparisons are clearer with respect to other values
by which the quality of dispute resolution systems might be mea-
sured. The cost and the speed of achieving resolution, two ex-
tremely important values in many cases, clearly favor settlement
over either jury or bench trial. Settlement processes encourage a
less combative, more positive, forward-looking, and creative dy-
namic between the parties than does a trial. Settlement offers op-
portunities to communicate across party lines about subjects and
in ways that would never be permitted in trial. Settlement also of-
fers opportunities to fashion new relationships between former ad-
versaries. Compared to trials, settlement processes also expose par-
ties and counsel to substantially less stress over a shorter period of
time in a less public setting. For parties who want to protect their
privacy, or to avoid disclosure of certain especially sensitive infor-
mation, settlement processes offer obvious advantages.
There is another constellation of values, however, with respect
to which the comparison between settlement and trial processes
yields much less obvious answers. These values include the extent
to which the process empowers, includes, or alienates the parties,
as opposed to their lawyers. In this connection, we also should ex-
amine the extent to which the process permits either control or
participation by the parties, the opportunities the process provides
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for catharsis, and the feelings of procedural, as opposed to out-
come, satisfaction that the process engenders.
How well judicially hosted settlement conferences service
these values varies dramatically between judges and courts. There
are huge ranges of settlement conference styles, some of which per-
mit no participation at all by clients. 8 Settlement processes that
permit no participation by clients must be alienating and presuma-
bly offer little or no procedural satisfaction. Compared to these
kinds of settlement conferences, where only the judge and the law-
yers are present, any trial would offer more to client interests in
participation. On the other hand, as indicated above, some magis-
trates and judges in our court sometimes permit clients to partici-
pate directly and play a meaningful role in settlement conferences.
In some instances, clients also have significant input into decisions
about the nature of the procedure that will be used in settlement
negotiations, for example, whether there should be discussions in a
group setting, with all counsel and all parties present, or whether
certain expert or percipient witnesses should be brought in to give
narrative statements and be questioned by the judge. And in some
instances, clients participate more fully and have a richer opportu-
nity for catharsis in settlement procedures than they would in a
trial. For example, in some settlement negotiations, I spend a great
deal of time with parties permitting them to vent their anger over
some policy or some person's behavior, and in some conferences I
work closely with clients analyzing aspects of their financial condi-
tion that are important to assessing the kinds of contributions they
might make to a settlement but that would be wholly irrelevant at
trial.
But the percentage of cases in which the clients participate
more significantly in settlement conferences than they would at
trial probably is small, even in a court like ours, which has tried to
be responsive to the kinds of values being considered here. Trials
virtually always offer clients an opportunity to testify in public,
which can be an important vehicle for catharsis. And clients always
can watch the entire trial process as it unfolds-except, of course,
the deliberative process of the jury. In settlement conferences, by
contrast, much of the process takes place behind doors that are
closed to the clients: most of the analysis and negotiating are con-
ducted in secret, seriatim meetings between the magistrate and the
'8 E. Allen Lind, et al, The Perception of Justice: Tort Litigants' Views of Trial,
Court-Annexed Arbitration, and Judicial Settlement Conferences 13-14 (RAND Corpora-
tion Institute For Civil Justice, 1989).
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attorneys. Thus, even though the parties have little real control
over procedures at trial, and may feel alienated by the rigidities
and austerities of the trial process, it is not clear that values associ-
ated with party participation and catharsis are better served in
most settlement conferences than in most trials. It is worth noting,
however, that the structure and character of settlement confer-
ences are not fixed by the kinds of rigid rules that dictate the
shape of a trial. Since there is much more room for creativity and
flexibility in designing settlement conference formats, there is no
reason why procedures could not be devised that would apprecia-
bly increase participation by clients in the settlement dynamic.
In sum, there are some measures of value by which the settle-
ment process is clearly inferior to the trial process, whether jury or
non-jury. There are other measures of value, by contrast, by which
a judicially facilitated settlement negotiation is clearly superior.
With respect to yet other values, there is no clear superiority in
either process. What should be evident from this discussion, how-
ever, is that judicially hosted settlement processes contribute a
great deal more to some important values than do trials, and that
for some parties in some circumstances it will be clear that settle-
ment facilitated by a judge is in no sense "second class."
While it is important as a theoretical matter to compare judi-
cially facilitated settlement negotiations to trial processes, the
comparison that is far more significant in the real world is between
judicially hosted settlement conferences and negotiations in which
no neutral person participates at all, for it is the latter that is the
dominant mode of dispute resolution in this country today and
that is by far the more likely real alternative to the judicially facili-
tated process. I submit that the purely private negotiation process
often is compromised by serious shortcomings that make it clearly
inferior, in most instances, to the judicially facilitated alternative.
At the outset, however, I must acknowledge that reliable empirical
data about the quality of purely private negotiating is virtually
non-existent, and that my comparisons are based on personal ex-
perience-which was not substantial before coming on the
bench-anecdotes shared with me by other lawyers, and specula-
tion. This obviously is a thin data base.
I suspect, however, that the quality of the intellectual process
in many private negotiations, especially in smaller cases, leaves a
great deal to be desired. Lawyers are frequently the only players in
purely private negotiations. Direct negotiations between lawyers
can be extremely indirect. Litigators bring deeply suspicious and
self-protective instincts to the negotiation process. They are not
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trained to be forthcoming. They worry about protecting their cli-
ent's confidences, their own work product, their informational ad-
vantages, and their trial strategy. They are terrified of exposing
vulnerabilities in their case, weaknesses in their personality, or any
suggestion of infirmity in their resolve to take their opponent to
the proverbial mat. Negotiations between two or more people en-
cumbered with this kind of psychological baggage are not likely to
consist of systematic examinations of all the relevant evidence and
law, to say nothing of the extra-litigation considerations that might
play major roles in identifying sensible solutions to problems.
Rather, communication between adversaries is likely to be ex-
tremely guarded and highly postured, with key cards played very
close to the vest, important evidence concealed or overlooked, pos-
sible terms of agreement not disclosed, and the quality of the dia-
lectical analysis of the case seriously compromised. Fear or suspi-
cion may discourage lawyers even from putting possible solution
options on the table. The process of negotiating often may consist
of nothing more than ritualistic exchanges of numbers. Thus, there
is real reason to be concerned about the quality of the information
and the reliability of the reasoning that inform settlement deci-
sions in this setting.
There also is reason to be concerned about the efficiency of
purely private negotiations. One source of inefficiency is suggested
in the preceding paragraph: exaggerated fears can inspire the most
oblique, circuitous, and time consuming exchanges of information.
Another source of inefficiency is the feeling, apparently widespread
among litigators, that being the first to raise the question of settle-
ment is likely to be perceived by opposing counsel and his or her
client as a sign of weakness. This fear of being "the first to blink"
can mean that settlement simply is not discussed until near the
end of the pretrial period, after large amounts of client money has
been spent on marginally productive discovery and motion work. A
more cynical view would posit that lawyers sometimes are reluc-
tant to raise the question of settlement until they have milked the
case of as many billable hours as possible. In any event, I have
been surprised by the number of cases that come to me for a set-
tlement conference late in the pretrial period in which there have
been no discussions of settlement by counsel. I also have been
dispirited by the number of lawyers who say they simply cannot
talk to opposing counsel. Their inability to communicate with their
opponent has made them grateful to the court for compelling them
to participate in a judicially hosted settlement conference. Since a
great many cases settle without judicial help, the obstacles to com-
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munication I have described here obviously do not block all negoti-
ations in most cases. But they may increase the cost, delay the ini-
tiation and completion, and compromise the reliability of the
discussions in a great many cases.
There are additional significant shortcomings of purely private
negotiations. There is no external check on abuses of power by at-
torneys or parties in such negotiations. There is no neutral partici-
pant who would be in a position to compensate for imbalances be-
tween the skills or resources of opponents, or to raise issues that
might expose the patent unfairness of proposed terms. Nor is there
any external check on breaches of duties owed by lawyers to their
own clients, as would occur, for example, if a negotiating lawyer
elevated his or her interest in the fee above the interests of the
client.
Moreover, there are a great many private negotiations from
which the parties themselves are entirely excluded. Some negotia-
tions occur between lawyers over the telephone. Obviously in such
cases the process of resolving the dispute offers clients no opportu-
nity for catharsis, no equivalent to having their day in court. They
have no control over how terms are negotiated and cannot derive
any satisfaction from the character of the process, even if they are
fully satisfied with the result. More subtly, clients whose cases are
resolved by private negotiations can have no sense that a societal
process solved their problem. They cannot feel that society set up
machinery that they were able to use to repair-a social tear. It is
arguable that every time a dispute is resolved solely through pri-
vate negotiations we have lost an opportunity to use the dispute
resolution process as a means to help people feel more connected
to and respectful of our society.
Judicially hosted settlement negotiations, by contrast, directly
involve a neutral representative 'of the public in the dispute resolu-
tion process. If conducted with sensitivity, they can provide oppor-
tunities for some catharsis and some feeling of having had a day in
court. They can encourage respect for the law and a deeper sense
of connection to our society. Moreover, a judicial host is likely to
improve substantially the efficiency and the quality of communica-
tion, the character of the litigants' analysis of their case, and the
thoroughness of their exploration of solution options. The judicial
host also is likely to keep the parties talking longer than they oth-
erwise might, thus improving the likelihood that they will not fail
for want of trying or by inadvertent neglect of some possible terms.
These advantages leave me with little doubt that judicially hosted
settlement negotiations are, in a great many instances, superior to
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the most common alternative: purely private discussions between
opposing counsel.
II. EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUATION
A. Why Did the Court Establish the Early Neutral
Evaluation Program?
Early neutral evaluation ("ENE") is a unique program that
was designed by the subcommittee of former Chief Judge
Peckham's task force whose mandate was to explore the blossom-
ing world of alternative dispute resolution and determine whether
ideas or procedures being developed there could be adapted to or
incorporated in court-sponsored programs.19 The members of the
subcommittee launched their work in 1983 by conducting an inten-
sive study of the literature about various forms of ADR, contacting
local and national providers of ADR services, and interviewing pro-
fessionals with substantial ADR experience, for example, in labor
arbitration and mediation. In the same time frame, the subcom-
mittee, most of whose members were practicing lawyers, set out to
identify the principal sources of pretrial expense and delay in civil
litigation. 0 The subcommittee's plan was to isolate and analyze
the kinds of problems that generated most of the cost and delay,
then determine whether there were new procedures being devel-
oped in the alternative dispute resolution movement that might be
used to attack those problems. The directive from Chief Judge
Peckham to the subcommittee focused on the users of the adjudi-
catory process-the litigants-not on the court as an institution.
Judge Peckham made it clear that the goal was to save the liti-
gants money and time, not to reduce pressures on the court's
docket.
The subcommittee identified several major sources of pretrial
cost and delay that it wanted to try to attack through procedural
innovation. The first was pleading practice. The subcommittee be-
lieved that pleadings in federal court too often simultaneously
overstate and undercommunicate, leaving parties without a clear
19 See Wayne D. Brazil, Michael A. Kahn, Jeffrey P. Newman and Judith Z. Gold,
Early Neutral Evaluation: An Experimental Effort to Expedite Dispute Resolution, 69 Ju-
dicature 279 (1986). Important contributions to the evolution of early neutral evaluation
also have been made by Melvin R. Goldman, James P. Kleinberg, Charles R. Ragan and
William A. Robinson, lawyers who have served for seven years on Judge Peckham's task
force.
20 See, for example, David M. Trubek, et al, -The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31
UCLA L Rev 72 (1983).
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understanding of the content or dimensions of their dispute.
Pleadings too often disguise the real center of the dispute. They do
not equip opponents to identify the areas in which they really disa-
gree or even to isolate the contentions that will be pursued seri-
ously. Defendants often cannot tell, from the pleadings, which of
many causes of action plaintiffs are serious about, and plaintiffs
cannot be sure which of the many affirmative defenses the defend-
ants really intend to push. Moreover, the communication across
party lines that begins so badly with pleadings often remains poor.
Thus, parties feel constrained to resort to the expensive and slow
formal procedures of the adjudicatory process, motion work and
discovery, to find out what the center of their dispute is.
A second source of expense and delay is the difficulty parties
and lawyers sometimes have bringing themselves to do their core
investigative homework, and to conduct a thorough and dispas-
sionate assessment of their situation early in the life of the case.
The lawyers on the subcommittee recognized that the economics of
litigation practice and certain psychological facts of life often con-
spire to delay the case development process. Lawyers are forced to
accept more work than they can comfortably handle. They put out
the hottest fires first. And like other people, they put off the
toughest decisions and the most demanding analyses as long as
they can. Moreover, early in the case, clients' emotions are espe-
cially likely to run strong, and lawyers are especially likely to feel
the need to impress their clients with the vigor of their advocacy.
Filing motions and conducting discovery are convenient and remu-
nerative arenas for displaying mettle as an advocate. And since dis-
covery in particular is relatively easy intellectually, a momentum
develops in many cases that seems to make extensive formal dis-
covery inevitable.
Systematic and objective analysis of a case, by contrast, is not
easy and does not lend itself to display of adversarial muscle. The
result is that lawyers and clients often find it difficult, early in the
pretrial period, to muster the discipline to confront systematically
and objectively their situation in the litigation. They have trouble
developing a holistic perspective and seeing the case through their
opponent's eyes, appreciating the strengths of his or her position.
The lawyers on the subcommittee felt that unrealistic expecta-
tions by clients also can be a significant source of cost and delay.
More than occasionally, the lawyers felt, clients need a reality
check. Sometimes that need for a reality check cannot be satisfied
by a client's own lawyer because sometimes clients lack confidence,
especially early in the pretrial period, in their own lawyer's assess-
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ment of the case. Unrealistic expectations can inspire unwise deci-
sions about how much money to spend. on litigation and how long
to hold out for more attractive settlement offers.
Members of the subcommittee also believed that the aliena-
tion from the litigation process that some clients feel can increase
pretrial costs and delay settlement. The alienation some clients
feel seems to have two principal sources: they do not understand
the litigation process and they feel powerless in it. Some clients
who have such feelings may not become realistic until they are in-
cluded more directly in the process and until they have more confi-
dence in their understanding of how the system works and what is
likely to happen if the case goes to trial. Fear and distrust can
block sensible decisionmaking. The subcommittee made reducing
client alienation one of the goals of the new procedure it was de-
signing. Toward that end, the subcommittee searched for ways to
increase clients' direct participation in the early pretrial period
and to expand clients' knowledge not only of procedures but also
of the content and evidentiary underpinnings of their opponent's
position.
The subcommittee believed that clients were not the only par-
ticipants in the pretrial process whose decisions might be adversely
affected by unrealistic expectations or lack of confidence. Liti-
gators also have been known either to have inflated estimates of a
case's value or to feel considerable insecurity about their ability to
assess their client's position and predict the outcome at trial. Ei-
ther condition can cause lawyers to make, or fail to make, pretrial
decisions that impose needless costs on clients. For example, a law-
yer who lacks confidence in his or her assessment of a case might
reject reasonable settlement proposals until he or she has com-
pleted much more discovery than is really necessary in order to
value the case reliably for settlement purposes. The subcommittee
sought to attack these problems by designing a procedure that
would move information across party lines faster and more directly
than motions and formal discovery, and that would provide both
counsel and their clients with early neutral assessments of the case
from an independent and highly credible source.
One additional source of cost and delay that the subcommittee
sought to attack through the procedure it was designing warrants
mention here. Like other members of the task force, the lawyers on
this subcommittee felt that some lawyers and clients were need-
lessly reluctant to raise the subject of settlement, especially early
in the pretrial period. Afraid that being the first to bring up the
question of settlement will be perceived as a sign of weakness,
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some lawyers plow through the pretrial ritual waiting for their op-
ponent to raise the issue, even though there is ample information
available to value the case reliably for settlement purposes. In a
variation on this theme, some lawyers feel the need to "teach" an
opposing lawyer or client about the value of the case before
launching settlement negotiations, but instead of trying to accom-
plish the "teaching" objective by directly providing information
about the case, they resort to expensive, time-consuming processes
like formal discovery and motions.
The subcommittee believed that, in all too many cases, the re-
sult of the confluence of some or all of the forces described above is
that case development meanders, discovery and motion work is not
well-focused or is postponed until some deadline forces counsel to
turn to it, and serious consideration of settlement is left until the
end of the pretrial period, after very substantial sums have been
expended in only marginally fruitful pretrial rituals.
Having decided that these are the principal sources of cost
and delay in the pretrial period that might be vulnerable to some
kind of innovative procedural attack, the subcommittee returned
to the information it had gathered from the world of alternative
dispute resolution. Unfortunately, it could find no one procedure
that fit the environment and that held sufficient promise of meet-
ing most of the needs the subcommittee had identified. So, borrow-
ing pieces of procedures from many different sources, and generat-
ing some fresh ideas of its own, the subcommittee forged a truly
unique, hybrid process that it labeled "early neutral evaluation."
B. What Is Early Neutral Evaluation?
At the center of the early neutral evaluation procedure is a
confidential, non-binding case evaluation conference, attended by
all counsel and their clients, hosted by a neutral member of the
private bar who has very substantial litigation experience and who
is an expert in the principal subject matter of the lawsuit. This
conference, also called an ENE session, takes place early in the
pretrial period so that the parties will be in a position to use what
they learn and accomplish during the proceeding to make the case
development and settlement processes more rational, less expen-
sive and less time-consuming. General Order Number 26, which
governs the program, requires the conference to be held within 150
days of the filing of the complaint unless the court orders
otherwise.
The typical ENE session, which lasts for more than two hours,
begins with the evaluator, who has been selected and trained by
[1990:
COURT-SPONSORED ADR
the court, making an opening statement that explains the purposes
of the program and outlines the procedures that will be followed at
the meeting. She also uses her opening statement to set an appro-
priate tone, which is analytical, informal and constructive. She em-
phasizes that one of her primary goals is to help the parties better
understand one another's positions and to search for the most sen-
sible, cost effective ways to set up their case for disposition. She
explains that she has no power over their behavior or the way they
conduct their case, and that she will not communicate with the
assigned judge about what transpires at the ENE conference. She
points out that the court has set up this procedure, and asked her
to commit several hours of her time to it, without compensation, in
order to provide parties who are proceeding in good faith with a
flexible, efficient vehicle for containing the costs and improving the
quality of the process by which they resolve their dispute. She also
explains that the court required the parties to be present in order
to give them an opportunity to communicate more directly about
their positions, to see how their case looks in the context of their
opponent's situation, to hear a neutral assessment of the matter by
the evaluator, and to participate in decisionmaking about how the
case should be developed for motions, settlement or trial.
After completing her opening statement, the evaluator asks
the plaintiff to make a brief, perhaps 15 minute, presentation of
his case, explaining the legal theories on which he is relying and
describing the evidence that supports each major element of each
theory. Such presentations may be made by counsel, client or both.
They are narrative in form; interruptions or objections by the op-
position are not permitted. The side making such a presentation is
encouraged to point whenever feasible to specific documents, wit-
nesses, or other evidence that supports important factual conten-
* tions. The evaluator permits parties to bring percipient or expert
witnesses to these conferences and to include statements by them
in the presentation of the case, but testimony is not taken-there
is no direct or cross-examination of witnesses-and statements are
not made under oath. Thus far in the history of this program, most
parties have chosen not to bring witnesses to the evaluation
session.
After plaintiff completes this initial account of the case, de-
fendant makes a similar presentation from its vantage. Thereafter,
the evaluator may permit each side to make a brief responsive
presentation and/or to ask questions of the other. Then the evalu-
ator asks questions of both sides, attempting to clarify arguments
and evidence, fill in evidentiary gaps, and probe for strengths and
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weaknesses. After a substantial period of this kind of dialectic, the
evaluator is ready to proceed to the next stage.
Her first task is to try to identify common ground, that is,
matters as to which the parties agree. At this juncture one of her
objectives is to encourage the parties to enter stipulations as to as
much of the relevant facts and law as possible, thus reducing the
arenas in which discovery, motion work and trial are necessary.
Then the evaluator attempts to articulate, concisely, the key dis-
puted issues in the case, factual and/or legal. This is a very impor-
tant component of her work, because a principal purpose of the
ENE process is to help the parties understand more clearly what it
is, exactly, that they disagree about, and then to appreciate what
the legal significance might be of the different possible resolutions
of these key points. After completing this "issue identification"
process, the evaluator retires to another room where she prepares
her written case evaluation. In this informal document, which
never becomes part of the record of the case and is not shared with
the assigned judge, the evaluator sets forth, briefly, her assessment
of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each side's case, articu-
lates her best judgment as to which side is likely to prevail on the
merits and, if it is the plaintiff, what the range of damages is likely
to be. As important, she sets forth as specifically as possible the
reasons that support her conclusions.
After preparing this brief written evaluation, she returns to
the ENE conference room. She announces that she has drafted an
informal evaluation of the case, but then asks if the parties would
like to try to explore settlement possibilities before she discloses
her written assessment to them. If either party resists the idea of
launching settlement negotiations, the evaluator promptly dis-
closes her evaluation to both sides. But if both sides are interested
in working on settlement first, the evaluator begins settlement dis-
cussions. She is given considerable discretion in deciding how to
conduct negotiations in this environment, and she is to take into
account the parties' procedural preferences. She may decide that
all settlement negotiations should take place in the group setting,
or that some would be more productive if she met in private with
one side at a time. If the parties reach an agreement as a result of
the negotiations, the evaluator encourages them to commit it to
writing.
If the parties are not able to reach a settlement, the evaluator
reconvenes the conference and turns to the next task: helping the
parties develop a plan that will position the case as efficiently as
possible for disposition by further settlement negotiations, by mo-
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tion or by trial. If she has not already done so, she shares her writ-
ten case evaluation with both sides. She then uses that evaluation,
along with anything she has learned in the settlement negotiations
that she is free to share across party lines, to identify what sepa-
rates the parties and to suggest the most sensible, cost-effective
way to attack that separation. If lack of information or evidence
about key issues is what separates the parties, the evaluator sug-
gests a plan for sharing that information informally-less expen-
sively than through the formal discovery process-or for discover-
ing it-for example, from non-parties. If a significant source of
separation between the parties is a disagreement about what the
law is, the evaluator suggests an expedited motion plan. If it is
clear that what separates the parties cannot be attacked by more
information (evidence or legal rulings), because, for example, they
disagree fundamentally about who is telling the truth, or about
some matter of principle, then the evaluator's job is to suggest a
focused plan for getting the case ready for trial. She makes it clear
that her case development suggestions are not binding and will not
be shared with the assigned judge; rather, she offers them only as a
service to help parties who might find the ideas useful.
To capitalize fully on the learning that occurs at the ENE ses-
sion and the momentum that can be generated there, the evaluator
tries to schedule some kind of follow-up after the initial confer-
ence. Often that follow-up will take the form of settlement negotia-
tions that the evaluator offers to host, perhaps after the parties
have shared informally or developed through discovery the key in-
formation they feel they need to value reliably the case. In the al-
ternative, the follow-up might be limited to a party responding, by
a date stipulated, to a request for certain information about the
merits of the case or to an offer or demand that was made at the
initial ENE session. Occasionally, all participants will agree that
another full ENE session is warranted. Or the parties might agree
to another meeting devoted solely to discovery or motion practice
planning after a ruling by the court on a pending motion. Any po-
tentially time-consuming or expensive follow-up commitments are
purely voluntary; the evaluator is not empowered to impose them.
The evaluator simply makes suggestions and encourages the par-
ties to use her services in any manner that they believe promises to
be productive.
In the vast majority of cases, the parties are charged no fee for
the service that the ENE program delivers to them. The rare ex-
ception to this rule arises when both sides of a very large and com-
plex case have ample resources and when the evaluator is required
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to commit substantially more than five hours to the matter. In
such circumstances, the court may order the parties to pay the
evaluator a reasonable fee for the time he or she had to spend in
excess of the five hours. Moreover, even though the indirect ex-
penses of participating in the session may be substantial, for exam-
ple, travel to the session, time spent in it, and fees charged by their
own attorneys for the time they commit to preparing for and par-
ticipating in the ENE session, the court believes that in the vast
majority of cases the net economic effect of the program is to save
litigants money and time.
Cases enter the ENE program in one of three ways. The par-
ties may stipulate to inclusion of their case in the program, or a
party may ask the assigned judge to order the matter referred to
ENE over an opponent's objection. At the time of this writing,
however, the vast majority of cases that are in the ENE program
have been designated automatically for it by virtue of the adminis-
trative application of criteria set forth in General Order Number
26. Relying in part on what it learned during two stages of experi-
ments, described below, the court has developed criteria for identi-
fying the kinds of cases that it believes are likely to benefit most
from the ENE procedure. Class actions are not designated for the
program, in part because of the unusual procedural constraints on
such actions and in part because the assigned judge is compelled to
play such an active role in the case development process from the
outset. Cases in which the principal relief sought is equitable, other
than declaratory relief actions involving disputes between claim-
ants competing for insurance proceeds, or in which one or more of
the parties are proceeding in pro se, also are not designated for
ENE. Similarly, cases that are compelled to participate in the
court's nonbinding arbitration program are almost never desig-
nated for ENE.21 The arbitration program reaches contract and
personal injury matters in which damages do not exceed $150,000,
exclusive of any punitive award that might be entered and of inter-
est and costs. After disqualifying the cases to which any of the
foregoing criteria apply, the court automatically orders into ENE
every other case that falls within any one of the following subject
matter categories, as identified by counsel on the Civil Cover Sheet
21 Judicially hosted settlement conferences are conducted in some cases that have been
designated for ENE. In some cases, the parties who have been through the ENE program
ask the court to provide a settlement conference, and in some cases the assigned judge or-
ders such parties to participate in a settlement conference, usually hosted by a magistrate.
[1990:
COURT-SPONSORED ADR
that must be filed with every complaint: insurance, Miller Act,22
negotiable instrument, stockholders suits, "other contract," con-
tract product liability, motor vehicle, motor vehicle product liabil-
ity, "other personal injury," personal injury product liability,
"other fraud," employment civil rights, copyrights, patent, trade-
mark, antitrust, RICO, and securities/commodities/exchange.
In deciding not to compel cases that fall into other subject
matter categories to participate in ENE, the court took into ac-
count not only its judgments about the types of cases likely to ben-
efit most from ENE, but also the administrative burdens that try-
ing to service additional categories of cases would impose on court
staff, the difficulty of establishing a sufficiently large pool of evalu-
ators who could qualify as experts in the subject area-this could
be an almost insurmountable problem with respect to esoteric sub-
ject areas in which only a few cases are filed annually, and the pro-
jected difficulty of finding evaluators without conflicts of interest.2"
Applying the criteria set forth in General Order Number 26
results in between 20 and 40 civil cases per month being desig-
nated for ENE. This represents some five to 12 percent of all
monthly civil filings." It appears that an ENE conference will be
held in no more than about half of the matters so designated. This
substantial attrition rate is a result of many factors: some cases are
voluntarily dismissed or settled prior to the ENE conference; some
matters are removed from the program on motion of one or more
parties, for example, because resolution of the matter cannot be
achieved until disposition of a closely related case that is pending
in another jurisdiction, some matters are removed from the pro-
gram administratively because the clerk's office erred in applying
the criteria of General Order Number 26, and yet other matters
leave our court pursuant to remand orders. Given the high rate of
attrition, we expect ENE sessions to. be held in about ten to 15
cases per month.
40 USC § 270(b) (1988).
Disqualifying conflicts of interest could arise, for example, if the proposed evaluator
were currently in litigation involving a lawyer who would appear before him at the ENE
conference. Conflicts of interest are especially likely to surface with respect to subject areas
where there is a significant amount of litigation but where such specialized knowledge is
required that there are only a limited number of local lawyers or firms who actively practice
in the field, for example, tax litigation.
" These figures do not include certain categories of cases that tend to be handled
outside the adjudicatory mainstream, like government efforts to collect student loans, re-
views of administrative dispositions of social security matters, and habeas corpus petitions.
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C. Does ENE Work? On Balance, Does the ENE Procedure
Deliver Benefits to the Parties That Are Sufficient to Justify
the Resources That They, The Evaluators and the Court
Commit to This Program?
Given the relatively modest number of cases per month in
which ENE conferences are held, this program is not likely to be-
come a major force in docket reduction, although its contribution
to that end may be larger than might at first blush appear because
some of the dismissals and settlements that occur prior to ENE
sessions may be caused by the imminence of such a substantial ex-
ternal event. Docket reduction, however, never has been a primary
purpose of ENE. From the outset, this program has been designed
to deliver service to the users of our court: the litigants themselves.
Our primary goal has been to provide litigants of good faith with a
means for reducing the cost and improving the rationality of the
process by which their cases are resolved. And while we cannot
measure precisely how much ENE contributes toward these ends,
we have substantial reason to believe that in most cases what the
procedure delivers to litigants is clearly sufficient to justify the re-
sources committed to it.
From the time the task force first began evolving the ENE
idea, the court has insisted on careful experimentation accompa-
nied by substantial efforts to collect and analyze data about the
effects of the ENE procedure. After reviewing the task force's ini-
tial design of the procedure, the court decided to launch a very
modest experiment, called a pilot program, to determine whether
there was any real world promise in ENE and, if so, to identify any
significant. bugs in the system. In 1985, the court selected about a
dozen cases, representing a broad range of civil matters, for partici-
pation in the pilot program. The court also arranged to have Pro-
fessor David I. Levine of the University of California, Hastings
College of the Law, monitor the progress of the assigned cases and
analyze the effect of ENE on them. Professor Levine attended six
ENE sessions. Then, for all of the cases that had been designated
for this initial experimental stage, he conducted in-depth inter-
views of the participants, lawyers, clients and evaluators, learning
in this way the views of 50 of the 57 people who had direct contact
with the procedure.2 5
25 See David I. Levine, Early Neutral Evaluation: A Follow-up Report, 70 Judicature
236 (1987).
[1990:
COURT-SPONSORED ADR
Professor Levine's findings about the effects of the program,
and his report about the opinions of the lawyers and clients who
participated, were sufficiently promising to persuade the court to
launch a second, much more ambitious experimental stage of the
new program. After making adjustments based on what was
learned in the initial pilot phase, the court launched wh at came to
be called the "100 case experiment" in mid-1986. In this second
stage of experimentation, the court designated for inclusion in the
ENE program about 150 lawsuits, but attrition resulted in ENE
sessions being held in only 67 cases.
Supported by a grant from the National Institute for Dispute
Resolution, Professor Levine conducted a more elaborate analysis
of this second experimental stage. In addition to tracking what
happened to the cases, he and his research assistants collected,
through both written questionnaires and substantial telephone in-
terviews, data and opinions from evaluators, litigators, and clients.
He has reported the results of his research much more fully in
other publications than is feasible here.26 For present purposes, it
will suffice to highlight the data by which the court was most im-
pressed when it voted, in 1988, to make ENE a permanent
program.
Among the data and opinions Professor Levine reported, prob-
ably the most significant was the fact that almost 90 percent of the
lawyers whose cases had been compelled to participate in ENE ex-
pressed the view that the program should be expanded to more
cases in the federal court. Thus, it appears that nine out of every
ten of these lawyers believe that ENE can be a productive, useful
procedure. Responses to other questions posed by Professor Levine
and his associates exposed the lawyers' opinions about the ways
that ENE contributed most: 77 percent felt that the evaluators
made useful contributions to the parties' understanding of the
case, 75 percent felt that the evaluators helped counsel identify the
key issues, 68 percent felt that the ENE procedure contributed to
settlement negotiations, 27 and 60 percent felt that ENE improved
communications across party lines.
6 David I. Levine, Early Neutral Evaluation: The Second Phase, 1989 J Dispute Res
1; David I. Levine, Northern District of California Adopts Early Neutral Evaluation to
Expedite Dispute Resolution, 72 Judicature 235 (1989); David I. Levine, Early Neutral
Evaluation Works, 2 ADR Report 278 (Part One) and 294 (Part Two) (BNA, 1988).
27 Responding to the mailed questionnaire, to a different question, and when less time
had elapsed since the ENE session, 58 percent of lawyer respondents opined that ENE im-
proved "prospects for settlement." Levine, 1989 J Dispute Res at 9.
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Professor Levine's data also indicated that the ENE procedure
was likely to contribute a great deal more to certain important pre-
trial goals than the judges' initial status conferences. Comparing
their ENE session to the way they have experienced initial status
conferences in the Northern District,2 95 percent of the surveyed
lawyers felt that ENE contributed more to communication across
party lines, 83 percent felt that ENE contributed more to issue
clarification, 88 percent felt that ENE contributed more to pros-
pects for settlement, and 73 percent felt that ENE contributed
more to setting the groundwork for cost effective discovery. These
assessments suggest that much that could be accomplished early in
the pretrial period is not being accomplished at the typical initial
conference that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 requires the
judges to conduct. While I will explore the several factors that
might explain why ENE might be so much more productive than
the typical Rule 16 conference in a subsequent section, it is suffi-
cient to note here that the evaluators devote much more time per
case to their conferences than the resources of the judges would
permit.
While promoting settlement never has been the primary objec-
tive of the ENE program, in part because it seems unrealistic, in
many cases, to expect settlement at a conference that takes place
early in the pretrial period, it is noteworthy that 25 of the 67 cases
(37 percent) in which an ENE session was held during the second
experimental stage of the program settled either at the ENE con-
ference or as a direct result, of it. The court also is confident that
some of the additional settlements or dismissals that occurred af-
ter cases were assigned to ENE but before the conference was held
were attributable, at least in some measure, to the imminence of
the ENE session and to the pressure to come to terms with the
case that preparing for such an event entails. And while very pre-
liminary data from the cases assigned to ENE since November of
1988 suggests that it is quite unlikely that more than 20 to 25 per-
cent of the cases will settle at the ENE session itself, it is clear
that litigators believe that the ENE process can make many signif-
icant contributions indirectly to prospects for achieving settlement,
What happens at the initial status conference can vary dramatically from judge to
judge and case to case. In some instances, the judge's courtroom deputy simply announces
dates for completion of discovery, filing motions, conducting the final pretrial conference
and commencing the trial. In other instances, the judge conducts extensive conversations
with counsel aimed at eliminating unimportant or uncontested issues and developing a plan
for streamlined preparation of the case for disposition by motion, settlement or trial.
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for example, by clarifying the issues, improving communication
across party lines, and assuring that the question of settlement is
raised early in the pretrial period, when cost effective plans can be
made to develop the information counsel need to set the case up
for productive negotiations.
Just under half (47 percent) of the litigators polled in Profes-
sor Levine's study believed that the ENE process, as implemented
during the second experimental stage, reduced the overall cost of
litigating their case. The accuracy and utility of these opinions is
subject to considerable doubt. The reliability of judgments on this
matter is seriously threatened by, among other things, lawyers not
being able to compare the expenses that were actually incurred in
the case to the expenses that would have been incurred if there
had been no ENE program. Since the dynamic that determines the
course of each federal civil suit is the product of such a complex
set of variables, many of which are unique to particular cases, for
example, the personalities and extra-litigation agendas of the par-
ties, it is impossible to compare with confidence the route to dispo-
sition of any two matters. Thus, the opinions expressed by the liti-
gators in Professor Levine's study are of only marginal utility in
determining whether, in most cases, ENE helps litigants save
money.
Even if the court were to take these opinions about cost at
face value, it is not clear what conclusion they would support.
Should the glass be viewed as half-empty or half-full? From one
perspective, having only 47 percent of the lawyers report that the
net effect of the ENE procedure was to save their clients money is
evidence that the program is not achieving in a sufficient number
of cases one of its primary goals. From a different perspective,
however, one could argue that a program that reduces the cost of
litigation in almost half the cases is quite successful.
Perhaps what is most significant is that Professor Levine's re-
search team did not uncover any substantial support for the view
that the burdens of participating in the ENE program outweighed
the benefits it delivered. Similar positive inferences about the net
value of the program to its users are supported by the reports from
the evaluators who conducted ENE conferences between Novem-
ber 1988 and February 1990. These reports, which are completed
on standardized forms, ask the evaluators whether "[o]n balance,
[they] believe that the ENE procedure resulted in benefits to the
parties sufficient to justify the resources that the parties and [the
evaluator] devoted to the ENE process?" Of the 150 reports re-
ceived from evaluators by late March 1990, only ten (about seven
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percent) indicated that ENE had not delivered enough to the liti-
gants to justify the resources it had consumed. Thus, in over 90
percent of the cases, the evaluator, who devoted at least several
hours to the process without compensation, emerged feeling that it
was worthwhile. Of course, evaluators have some interest in assess-
ing the value of their own work positively, but since doing this
work imposes on their time substantially, it is not likely that they
would in essence endorse continuation of the program unless they
believed it was delivering something of real value. Taken together,
the results of Professor Levine's surveys and the reports from the
evaluators suggest that ENE is making significant contributions to
the quality of the dispute resolution process, especially to the clar-
ity of understanding of issues and to communication across party
lines, even if we cannot be confident that it is causing significant
cost savings in a majority of cases.
The data that Professor Levine generated suggested two areas
in which the ENE process, as conducted during the second experi-
mental stage, was falling appreciably short of the designers' goals.
In cases that did not settle as a direct result of the ENE session, it
appears that the evaluator helped the parties fashion a discovery
plan only in about 40 percent of the cases. The percentage of un-
settled cases that emerged from the ENE session with formal stip-
ulations of fact or law was even lower. These disappointing results
may be attributable to two factors: (1) inadequate emphasis during
the training of the evaluators on these important objectives and (2)
the psychological fact that there is a strong sense of anti-climax
and a false sense of completion or closure after the evaluator
presents his or her ultimate judgment about the likelihood of lia-
bility and the probable range of damages. After the second experi-
mental stage exposed these problems, the court revised its training
of evaluators to alert them to these dangers and to stress the im-
portance of helping the litigants produce a discovery plan and to
hammer out stipulations before concluding the ENE conference.
Finally, it is important to note that the most important contri-
bution ENE makes may well vary with different kinds of cases.
Large, complex cases are not likely to settle at the first ENE ses-
sion. Rather, in these kinds of cases we would expect ENE to con-
tribute most to communication across party lines, issue clarifica-
tion, and case development planning. In smaller, less complex
matters, by contrast, ENE's greatest contribution likely will be to
helping achieve, or at least laying the groundwork for, an early
settlement.
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D. How Does the ENE Program Measure Up against Criticisms
of Court-Sponsored ADR?
1. Does ENE Represent an Abdication of the Judicial
Function?
Is ENE promoted by lazy judges whose real objective is to
avoid work that they should be doing? ENE is not the brainchild
of judges but of lawyers. While former Chief Judge Peckham ap-
pointed the task force to look for ways to reduce the cost burdens
that federal litigation has imposed on litigants, he played no role
at all in designing ENE itself. Nor did any other judge. The con-
cepts at the center of the program, and all of its principal ratio-
nales, were conceived by a subcommittee composed of lawyers and
one law professor, who subsequently became a magistrate. It also is
worth noting that when the court decided to make ENE a perma-
nent program there was no solid basis for assuming that this proce-
dure would significantly reduce docket pressures. While the experi-
mental stages had shown that ENE could deliver valuable services
to litigants, they had not shown that the program had the capacity
to increase overall settlement rates or to reduce the resources the
court committed to cases before they were terminated. Moreover,
limits in the pool of qualified evaluators and in the court's admin-
istrative resources meant that only a modest number of cases could
be designated for ENE annually. The court expected evaluation
sessions to be held in about 250 cases per year. That figure repre-
sents a small percentage of the annual civil filings in the Northern
District.
Moreover, the lawyers who designed ENE considered at some
length, and at various stages in the evolution of the program,
whether the role that the evaluators were being asked to play
should be played by judges or magistrates instead of by private
lawyers serving in effect as special masters. Several considerations
supported the subcommittee's conclusion that this role should be
played by private lawyers. First, the subcommittee recognized that
neither judges nor magistrates were likely to be in a position to
devote the substantial time to this role that would be required. It
was expected that the evaluators would devote about five hours to
each ENE assignment, divided among preparation for the first ses-
sion, hosting that session, and completing any follow-up to which
the parties might agree. As the program has evolved, many evalu-
ators devote substantially more than five hours to cases in which
they serve. The lawyers on the subcommittee felt that judges and
magistrates, whose resources already were strained by the tradi-
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tional demands of their jobs, could not reasonably be expected to
devote this amount of time to the ENE program. The committee
also felt that private lawyers might be specially energized by the
opportunity to step out of their day-to-day adversarial shoes and
to play this obviously constructive, quasi-judicial role. Thus, mem-
bers of the bar, serving as evaluators in no more than two cases per
year, might bring a level of enthusiasm and commitment to this
special role that at least some judges might have trouble
mustering.
Independent of these practical problems, which might be sur-
mountable by making adjustments in kinds of work allocated
among judicial officers, there were several additional substantive
considerations that pointed toward the same conclusion. The sub-
committee felt, for example, that it often would be inappropriate
for the assigned judge, in an off-the-record proceeding early in the
pretrial period, to be as candid with the parties about the
strengths and weaknesses of their positions, as would be useful in
an ENE session. It obviously is important that the parties have
confidence in the impartiality and open-mindedness of any judicial
officer who is compelled to rule on contested matters or preside at
trial. That confidence could be jeopardized if a judge rolled up his
or her sleeves early in the pretrial period and offered frank assess-
ments of the merits.
A closely related consideration focused not on the parties' per-
ceptions, but on the fear that in some cases the ENE process might
in fact adversely affect the impartiality and open-mindedness of
the judge. The host of an ENE conference might learn emotionally
charged or otherwise significant things about the parties that
would be wholly irrelevant at trial, or might be exposed to evi-
dence that would never be admissible. There also is a chance, of
course, that the neutral person at the ENE session would form
opinions about the merits of the case based on incomplete infor-
mation or a seriously underdeveloped record and would become
unreasonably wedded to premature views. The consequences of
thus contaminating, or appearing to contaminate, a judge, are sub-
stantially greater than are the consequences of contaminating or
appearing to contaminate a private lawyer who will have no power
to affect the outcome of the case.
The subcommittee also was concerned that if a judicial officer
hosted the ENE session, the parties and lawyers would be much
more likely to fear some form of retaliation by the court if they did
not agree with the evaluator's assessments and accept his or her
recommendations. The subcommittee did not want to risk any ap-
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pearance of coercion in a program whose goals were to create op-
portunities for the forces of reason, communication and good faith
to play the determinative roles. Similarly, there was a concern that
parties and lawyers might be less forthcoming with a judge or mag-
istrate serving as the evaluator than with a private attorney. The
concern was not that people were more likely to lie to a judge or
magistrate'-in fact, people may be less likely to lie to a judicial
officer-but that they would play their evidentiary and settlement
cards closer to their chest, thus reducing the value of the ENE ses'-
sion. Several factors might converge to make people less forthcom-
ing with a judicial host. One is fear of the judge or magistrate's
power to affect the outcome of the case. Not knowing how the
judge might react to different kinds of argument and evidence, and
apprehension about how he or she might wield power at subse-
quent stages of the litigation, could inspire parties and lawyers to
be very cautious about what information they put on the table at
an ENE session. The formality and intimidation of the courthouse
environment, as compared to the relative informality of a private
law office, might have a similar effect. It also was felt that lawyers
might be more likely to posture before a judicial officer than a neu-
tral attorney, simply because posturing seems to be a conditioned
response of some lawyers to judges.
A final consideration supporting the decision that it would be
wiser to have private lawyers play the role of evaluator in the ENE
program was the expectation that, in some cases, private lawyers
might be able to bring considerably greater subject matter exper-
tise to the conference table. Judges are generalists. Some private
lawyers, by contrast, devote large percentages of their time to spe-
cialized areas of practice and develop expertise in esoteric fields.
One of the distinguishing features of the ENE program is its insis-
tence on matching each case with an evaluator who has substantial
expertise in the subject matter at the center of the suit. For exam-
ple, only experienced patent attorneys serve as evaluators in pat-
ent cases. For cases not based on relatively straightforward con-
tract or tort theories, an evaluator with subject matter expertise
might be able to contribute more at the ENE session than some
generalist judges. All of the factors described here supported the
committee's decision to recommend that experienced, highly re-
garded private attorneys, rather than judicial officers, host the
ENE sessions.
Thus, one argument against the contention that the ENE pro-
gram represents an abdication of the judicial function is that many
of the functions performed by evaluators are not appropriately cat-
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egorized as "judicial." Among other things, there is an avuncular,
advice-giving, assistance-offering dimension to the evaluator's role
that does not fit traditional conceptions of judicial behavior. On
the other hand, it is obvious that evaluators address many matters
that also are addressed by judges in the formal adjudicatory set-
ting. Thus, it is fair to ask whether, through the ENE program,
judges abdicate some of their responsibilities by delegating them to
the evaluators.
At one level, the answer to this question clearly is "no." This
answer is based on the fact that none of the evaluators' recommen-
dations for case development planning and none of their opinions
about the merits of the parties' positions are to be communicated
to the assigned judge. Thus, the judge cannot expect to use the
evaluator's work. Instead, the judge retains the full scope of case
management responsibilities that he or she would have even if no
ENE program existed. The evaluator's suggestions can be incorpo-
rated formally into a pretrial order governing a particular case only
if all parties agree with them, join in a request (through written
stipulation) that the court adopt them, and the judge decides to
accept them. Thus far, in the history of the ENE program, we have
not seen evidence that this scenario is being played out in even a
modest percentage of the cases. It does appear that ENE leads
some parties to agree informally on means of sharing information
and on discovery and motion schedules, but these off-the-record
agreements seem to remain largely invisible to the assigned judge.
Thus, in fact as well as in theory, the existence of the ENE pro-
gram does not relieve judges of their case management
responsibilities.
On the other hand, it is disturbing to note that so many law-
yers believe that the judges' initial status conferences, as typically
conducted, are likely to contribute less than ENE sessions to com-
munication across party lines, issue clarification, prospects for set-
tlement, and laying the groundwork for cost-effective discovery.
During its experimental stages the ENE program reached such a
small percentage of the cases on the court's docket that one could
not plausibly argue that shortcomings in initial status conferences
were attributable to the existence of the ENE program, for exam-
ple, to expectations by judges that evaluation sessions would take
care of matters not adequately covered at the status conferences. It
is arguable, however, that we should proceed circumspectly when
adopting programs that, over time, might have the effect of reduc-
ing pressure on judges to make their initial status conferences
events that contribute significantly to the case development. pro-
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cess. While it is by no means clear that even a substantially ex-
panded ENE program would affect the way Article III judges per-
form their jobs, policy makers should keep the concern raised here
in mind as they monitor the way ENE works into the court's sys-
tem over the years.
There is an additional dimension to the concern about abdica-
tion of the judicial function that warrants discussion here. In the-
ory, the public appointment processes by which judges and magis-
trates get their jobs provide some assurances about the
qualifications of these judicial officers. The appointment process is
supposed to include examination into the experience, intellect and
character of prospective judicial officers. Reviews by bar associa-
tion committees and/or merit selection panels, as well as investiga-
tions by the FBI and IRS, normally precede judicial appointments.
These processes offer at least an appearance of "quality control"
that is an important part of maintaining public confidence in the
Third Branch. Thus, it would threaten important social values if a
court-sponsored ADR program did not include meaningful mea-
sures designed to assure that the people playing the neutral roles
were well-qualified.
There are several ways in which the ENE program tries to as-
sure quality control in evaluators. The court began the process of
building the pool of evaluators by asking each judge and magis-
trate to nominate experienced lawyers who had appeared before
them, performed ably, and seemed to possess the requisite quali-
ties of temperament and judgment. The memoranda that asked for
nominees emphasized the need for lawyers from a wide range of
backgrounds and listed the many separate subject areas in which
the program would need attorneys with expertise. Many judges
and magistrates responded by submitting the names of lawyers
whom they believed to be well-qualified. Nominees also were solic-
ited from the members of the court's task force. After the program
became more visible in the community, the court began receiving
unsolicited applications from lawyers who wanted to serve, without
compensation, as evaluators. When a substantial list of nominees
was developed, it was circulated to all of the judges of the court,
giving each an. opportunity to suggest that any nominee might not
be appropriate for the envisioned role. This process produced a list
of experienced lawyers in whom the court had reason to have confi-
dence. The Chief Judge then wrote to each nominee, explaining
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the program and the demands it would impose,29 then asking if the
person was in a position to volunteer to serve. The vast majority of
the almost two hundred lawyers so approached agreed to join the
evaluator pool.30
A commitment to serve as an evaluator included a commit-
ment to be trained for the role. For the first two experimental
stages of the program, all the evaluators came to the courthouse in
person for several hours of instruction about the program and how
to handle the evaluator role. The first group of about ten evalu-
ators also attended a lengthy debriefing session in which each at-
torney shared his experiences with the others and the court,
describing successes and problems and suggesting better ways to
approach the process. The court used the learning of these exper-
ienced lawyers not only to make changes in the content of the
ENE program, but also to design a training module that would an-
ticipate the mistakes most commonly made by evaluators and that
would identify the problems that were most likely to surface at
ENE sessions and suggest appropriate responses. During the sec-
ond stage of the experiment, the court actively solicited additional
suggestions from lawyers who had completed ENE sessions. Armed
with all this information, the court refined the training program
into its current form, which has been recorded on videotape so that
lawyers who are unable to attend the course in person may never-
theless complete the training prerequisite.
The court also provides each evaluator with a packet of writ-
ten materials about the program, how to perform their roles effec-
tively, and how to approach possible conflicts of interest. The
packet also includes forms the evaluators may use in scheduling
and structuring their sessions, as well as a questionnaire they are
asked to complete and return to the court after the ENE confer-
ence has been completed. In sum, the court has in place systems
for (1) training evaluators, (2) monitoring the progress of cases
designated for ENE, (3) learning the results of the ENE sessions,
and (4) generating feedback from evaluators, on a continuing basis,
about how the system is working and how it might be improved.
Even with these systems, the court acknowledges that its sys-
tem of "quality control" is imperfect. We have not built into the
program, for example, an ongoing mechanism through which liti-
gants and lawyers whose cases are compelled to participate in ENE
29 The court promised that it would not ask lawyers to host evaluation sessions in more
than two cases per year.
20 As of this writing, there are about 155 evaluators in the pool.
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can express their views about it. The court has established no di-
rect means to learn if an evaluator inappropriately handles some
aspect of an ENE conference. It is a virtual certainty that different
evaluators set different tones and follow somewhat different for-
mats in hosting sessions. Similarly, it is a virtual certainty that
some evaluators will make errors of judgment in analyzing cases
and in handling lawyers and parties-even with the public ap-
pointment process, of course, judges and magistrates make the
same kinds of errors. Because there are real limits on the resources
the court can devote to selecting, training and monitoring the per-
formances of the evaluators, and because there are about 155 dif-
ferent human beings functioning in this capacity, there is more
than a de minimis risk that, in some instances, the quality of
evaluators' performances will be wanting. There may even be cases
where, because of mistakes they make, ENE does more harm than
good. Given the constraints within which a program like this must
operate, the question is not whether quality control will be perfect,
but whether its inevitable imperfections create risks that outweigh
the benefits the program delivers. Based on the extensive feedback
that Professor Levine acquired from the lawyers and litigants
whose cases were ordered into the ENE program during its two
experimental stages, the court has answered this important ques-
tion in favor of ENE. Nonetheless, the court is committed to con-
tinuing to monitor the program, to sponsoring periodic studies by
independent observers, and to modifying or abandoning ENE
should significant negative evidence begin surfacing.
Is the purpose or effect of ENE to make it more difficult and
more expensive for parties to get to trial or to pressure them to
settle? It is absolutely clear that the court did not adopt the ENE
program in order to pressure clients to settle their cases or to make
access to a trial more expensive. While one of the purposes of the
program is to provide litigants with a means for exploring settle-
ment early in the case, evaluators are taught that they should work
on settlement only if all the parties are interested in doing so and
that they (the evaluators) have no power to compel negotiations.
Evaluators also are taught that the center of the program is not
settlement, but revolves around issue clarification, dispassionate
analysis of the parties' positions, and case development planning.
Nor has any purpose of ENE ever been to make access to a
trial more expensive. As emphasized earlier, the principal directive
from former Chief Judge Peckham to the architects of ENE was to
fashion a procedure that litigants could use to reduce the cost of
resolving their disputes. Having participated intimately in every
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stage of the design and implementation of ENE, I can affirm with-
out qualification that reducing parties' costs, not increasing them,
always has been a primary goal.
Nor are there other ways in which ENE serves as a barrier to
trial. Unlike some arbitration programs in some courts, no penal-
ties can be imposed on any party for proceeding to trial after an
ENE session, regardless of the outcome at trial. Moreover, since
the assigned judge is prohibited from learning either the evalu-
ator's assessment of the merits of the case or his or her recommen-
dations about discovery and motions, there is no opportunity for
judicial retribution for a party's or lawyer's failure to accept an
evaluator's opinion or recommendation.
2. Is the Underlying Purpose of ENE to Reduce Govern-
mental Involvement in Defining and Enforcing the Basic Rules of
the Social Order?
A response to this concern should begin by repeating two
points made earlier: (1) the criteria that determine which cases are
eligible for ENE assure the court and the public that the cases that
are most politically sensitive or controversial, or that implicate val-
ues that are most obviously of general social concern, are not desig-
nated for ENE, and (2) the program is relatively modest in size,
touching only five to 15 percent of the court's civil docket, and
leaving completely untouched every other case in each subject
matter category from which cases are designated for the program.
Thus, even in the affected categories, every other suit proceeds to-
ward disposition in the traditional manner. Moreover, class ac-
tions, most civil rights suits, cases that revolve around equitable
relief, and most actions involving labor relations are not designated
for ENE. And parties to actions that are designated for the pro-
gram are free to ask the court to have their case removed from it.
Thus, even with a robust ENE program, the court remains thor-
oughly involved in the process by which the rules of our society are
refined and enforced.Does ENE reduce pressure on Congress to fund federal courts
at adequate levels? This might be a real concern if ENE were ex-
panded so that it reached a larger percentage of the cases on the
court's docket, and if it developed that the effects of ENE include
an increase in the overall settlement rate or a reduction of the ju-
dicial resources expended on civil actions prior to their termina-
tion. ENE certainly involves an element of reliance on the private
sector and could be perceived by policy makers as a means to cut
crowded dockets without expending significant public funds. It re-
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mains unclear, however, what effects ENE will have on settlement
rates or on the amount of attention judges must devote to their
cases before they are resolved.
In this connection, it is important to note that there may be
significant limits on how large ENE programs can become. The
success of ENE depends centrally on the quality and dedication of
the lawyers who serve, without compensation, as evaluators. Even
in major metropolitan areas, there are likely to be real limits on
the number of litigators who are qualified-by experience, subject
matter expertise, analytical ability and temperament-willing, and
available to serve as evaluators. In smaller communities, by con-
trast, the growth of ENE programs may be limited by greater diffi-
culty finding lawyers who would not be disqualified from serving
by conflicts of interest.
Does the ENE program increase the likelihood that both the
outcomes of disputes, and the processes by which they are re-
solved, will remain secret? The procedures that evaluators are
taught to follow at ENE sessions are, of course, public knowledge.
It is likely, however, that individual evaluators depart from the
script more than occasionally. It is especially likely that there is a
range of approaches to the settlement negotiations that occur in
connection with some ENE conferences. Since the public is not in-
vited to ENE sessions, it has no way of knowing what specific pro-
cess was used in any given case. Similarly, if a settlement is
reached that the parties decide not to put into the court record, it
is not clear how the public could learn its terms. As noted in dis-
cussing the court's settlement program, however, the important
question is whether ENE significantly increases the settlement rate
in the categories of cases it reaches. As of this writing, we simply
do not know.
At the risk of belaboring the obvious, however, I repeat that in
the vast majority of civil cases the question is not whether settle-
ment will occur, but how and when. The forces that determine
whether a case will settle are quite powerful and probably operate
in substantial measure independently of the procedures used to
pursue an agreement. If that is true, the choice is not between pub-
lic trial and private settlement, but between settlement through
negotiations in which no neutral takes part and negotiations that
are assisted by a neutral. If the neutral is experienced, bright, and
has good interpersonal skills, I would argue that a process that is
assisted by the neutral is likely to be superior.
How much concern we feel about the "privatization" of the
dispute resolution process also should depend, in part, on the
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kinds of cases we are talking about. The bulk of the cases ENE
reaches involve fights between private citizens or corporations over
money. While such disputes certainly have indirect implications
that may be of some social significance, they usually neither impli-
cate directly nor explicate meaningfully any important public pol-
icy issues. Moreover, even in the categories of cases that ENE
reaches, every other lawsuit is excluded from the program and thus
is left to be resolved under the traditional rules of litigation. And,
as noted above, ENE simply does not reach many of the categories
of cases in which the public interest is likely to be most acute.
Thus, even if ENE does increase the settlement rate for the cases
it touches, it leaves untouched the bulk of the most socially sensi-
tive suits.
3. Is the ENE Program Changing the Role of Judges or the
Character of the Court?
There is no evidence that the existence of ENE substantially
affects how the judges spend their time or run their dockets. Gen-
eral Order Number 26 specifically commands the clerk of the court
and the evaluators to "schedule E.N.E. events and administer the
program in a manner that does not-interfere in any way with the
management of the action by the assigned judge." The General Or-
der goes on to provide that "[n]o party may seek to avoid or post-
pone any obligations imposed by the assigned judge on any ground
related to the E.N.E. program."3 Moreover, responsibility for all
aspects of administration of the program is concentrated in one
designated magistrate and a separate small unit of the clerk's of-
fice, with whom he works closely. That magistrate also hears in the
first instance all requests for relief from any aspect of the rules
that govern the program and is charged with responsibility for as-
suring compliance with the ENE rules. In the rare instances where
compliance has been a problem, it is this magistrate who issues the
order to show cause and recommends the appropriate response by
the court. Thus, it is a rare day that any judge is called upon to
take any action at all with respect to the ENE program. Clearly,
ENE does not reduce the judicial resources that are available to
perform traditional adjudicatory functions. If anything, ENE frees
up such resources by encouraging better communication between
adverse parties, clearer understanding of issues, cooperation in dis-
" General Order No. 26, as amended January 1, 1990.
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covery and motion practice, and serious consideration of settle-
ment earlier in the pretrial period.
At a more subtle level, however, the existence of programs like
ENE and nonbinding arbitration do affect the character of the
court as an institution. It certainly is a departure from the tradi-
tional image of the passive/reactive judicial institution for the
court to set up, administer and compel parties to participate in
procedures where members of the private bar play key roles as
neutrals, providing case evaluation and consulting services that
substantially supplement the formal processes in which the judges
directly participate. While members of the private bar have played
significant roles in the judicial system for a long time-for exam-
ple, as special masters, court appointed experts, and judges pro
tempore-the Northern District's programs represent a degree of
institutionalization of this basic idea that is new. 32 By adopting
several different programs, each substantial in character and each
affecting a meaningful number of cases, the Northern District has
converted itself from an essentially one-dimensional institution,
where one formalistic process was applied routinely to the vast ma-
jority of civil actions, to a multi-dimensional institution that deliv-
ers several different packages of procedural services.
Moreover, by permitting litigants to volunteer their cases into
any of its programs, the court has taken at least a small step to-
ward a system in which parties and counsel can play meaningful
roles in determining what kind of process is best suited to resolv-
ing their particular dispute. The court is encouraging counsel and
client to acknowledge a greater range of procedural choice and,
with that, to accept more responsibility for thinking, actively,
about how best to work toward disposition of their actions. The
court is encouraging lawyers and litigants to perceive themselves
less as helpless procedural drones and more as active partners,
sharing with the court responsibility to shape or select dispute res-
olution procedures that make sense. In short, the court is begin-
ning to move away from procedural authoritarianism, sincerely in-
viting lawyers and clients to join in a cooperative search for the
a Prior to reforms that took effect in 1912, the use of special masters in equity pro-
ceedings in federal courts was extensive and controversial. One important difference, how-
ever, between that use of masters and the Northern District's programs is that to a trouble-
some degree masters in the old equity system supplanted, rather than supplemented, the
judicial role. See Wayne D. Brazil, Authority to Refer Discovery Tasks to Special Masters:
Limitations on Existing Sources and the Need for a New Federal Rule in Managing Com-
plex Litigation: A Practical Guide to the Use of Special Masters 336-44 (American Bar
Foundation, 1983).
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fairest and most efficient ways to move cases toward disposition. A
substantial and permanent change in this direction would re-
present a marked change in the judicial institution. It is not obvi-
ous, however, that changes in this direction are lamentable.
There is another, more controversial way in which the ENE
program represents a departure from traditional ideas about the
roles that judicial officers and their agents should play in litigation.
It is arguable that evaluators are likely to penetrate earlier and
deeper than most judges into (1) decisions by counsel and client
about the pacing of case development, (2) the relationship between
counsel and client, and (3) the dynamic across party lines between
opponents. Among these three areas, the gap separating judges
from evaluators is smallest with respect to interference with pri-
vate decisions about the pacing of case development. Fixing sched-
ules and deadlines, and pressing parties to quicken the pace of pre-
paring matters for trial, is probably the area in which most federal
judges are most active as case managers. Even so, ENE usually
adds significant case development pressures. General Order Num-
ber 26 compels parties to effect service within 40 days, requires
court approval for any stipulation that would extend the time to
respond to pleadings, and commands that the evaluation session be
held within 150 days of the filing of the complaint. While parties
more than occasionally petition for relief from these constraints, it
is clear that ENE forces on most litigants a faster pace for case
development than they otherwise would adopt. Further, the nature
of the ENE conference generates considerably more pressure on
counsel than a typical initial status conference. Counsel know that
at the ENE session they will be required to explain, in English
rather than in "pleading-ese," their clients' positions and to pre-
sent evidence in support of them. They know that their client, op-
posing counsel and the opposing party will be there, watching
them perform. They know that their presentation will be com-
pared, by everyone present, to opposing counsel's presentation.
They know that the evaluator will ask probing questions and will
articulate an assessment of the relative strengths and weaknesses
of the parties' positions. They know that these assessments will be-
come significant factors in subsequent efforts to settle the case.
They also know that the evaluator will make recommendations
about discovery and motion practice that could affect positions
their opponents take on these important matters. Knowing all this,
counsel are likely to feel considerable pressure to prepare well for
the ENE conference. And since that conference is likely to occur
relatively early in the pretrial period, the ENE program may well
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interfere substantially with counsel's freedom to fix the pace of
case development. The reasoning that persuaded the task force
and the court that this kind of interference is justified is set forth
in the section describing why the court adopted the ENE program.
It will suffice here to note that the court felt delays and expenses
that could be avoided would continue to plague the system if con-
trol of the pace of case development was left in the hands of
overcommitted lawyers and their clients, some of whom have been
known to look for ways to put off the day of reckoning.
An even more controversial aspect of ENE is the opportunity
it creates for evaluators to penetrate and interfere with the rela-
tion between a lawyer and his client. Evaluators may ask probing
questions, expose holes in arguments and deficiencies in evidence,
frankly compare the strengths and weaknesses of the parties' posi-
tions, suggest new perspectives from which to view the evidence or
new theories on which to prosecute or defend the case, predict out-
comes at trial, and urge the parties to consider terms of settlement
that neither had put on the table. There is more than a slight risk
in all of this that a client will hear important things for the first
time from the evaluator, or that the evaluator, who is presented by
the court as an expert in the subject matter of the litigation, will
offer opinions or make suggestions that contradict advice a lawyer
has given his client in private, or that a lawyer will be embarrassed
in front of his client because he is not able to respond adequately
to questions the evaluator asks or to negative comments the evalu-
ator makes about his client's case. There is a risk that in crucial
capacities the evaluator will displace the lawyer in the client's eyes.
These are potentially serious intrusions into the lawyer-client rela-
tionship. We have no evidence that they occur often in ENE ses-
sions. And the fact that we have heard no complaints about such
matters from the bar suggests that these issues may be more theo-
retical than real. If it developed, however, that intrusions of this
kind occurred often in ENE conferences, deciding whether they
could be justified would be a difficult task. The court and the
members of the bar who advise it would be forced to balance quite
different competing values. The result of any such balancing would
depend, in part, on the severity of the intrusion problem, on the
one hand, and, on the other, the magnitude of the benefits ENE
delivered to fairness and efficiency.
The third arena that evaluators might penetrate more than
judges is the relationship across party lines, between the opposing
sides. An evaluator who performs all the tasks the court -asks of
him in an intellectually active manner might well alter the balance
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of power that would exist between the parties in the traditional
litigation environment. By examining the two most difficult ethical
questions an evaluator might face we can expose some of the
dimensions of this issue. In the training program, we ask evalu-
ators to consider what they should do if, during an ENE confer-
ence, they perceive a legal theory, a line of argument, a defense, or
a possible source of evidence that none of the lawyers or clients
have mentioned. An evaluator who takes the initiative to interject
any such matter might dramatically affect the course of the litiga-
tion, or might deprive one of the parties of an advantage that it
would have kept but for the ENE session.
While the court as a whole has taken no position with respect
to whether an evaluator should take this kind of initiative, the
magistrate who conducts the training sessions suggests that an
evaluator should point out the undisclosed theory or source of evi-
dence if he or she firmly believes that justice would not be done if
that theory or evidence were not interjected into the case. This
suggestion is inspired by the belief that courts are ultimately in the
business of doing justice and that, on the civil side of the docket,
justice is more likely to be done if all of the important legal and
evidentiary avenues are followed. It would be unseemly for an
agent of the court to purport to offer a candid and systematic as-
sessment of a case but not disclose a theory or a source of evidence
that he or she thought should play a significant role in determining
its outcome. By making this suggestion, the magistrate elevates the
value of achieving the legally correct outcome over the values of
punishing lawyers who are inept or who have not fully understood
their case and over any value that might attach to preserving ad-
vantages that "naturally" more clever or better prepared lawyers
might enjoy. The magistrate's recommendation also is inspired by
a recognition that even diligent, bright lawyers cannot be expected
to think of every legal angle or every source of evidence in every
case. Full, reliable thinking about legal problems can be an im-
mensely complex task. It is almost always best done when more
than one person thinks hard about the same set of issues and when
there is an active dialogue between minds with strong incentives to
make the explication complete. It follows that an evaluator who
decided not to expose an important theory or source of evidence
would not necessarily be punishing a lawyer who was inept or
underprepared, but would be damaging the quality of the adjudi-
cative process.
The second difficult ethical dilemma an evaluator might face
would arise if a party and his lawyer appeared to be prepared to
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accept terms of settlement that the evaluator firmly believed were
quite unfair. This is a dilemma that any' neutral host of settlement
negotiations might confront, including judges. The ENE training
program, as conducted in the past, has not directly discussed this
issue. Clues about how the bar is likely to feel about this topic are
available in responses to the ABA survey of litigators' views about
the roles judges should play in settlement negotiations. By
upwards of a two-to-one margin, most litigators indicated that it
would be improper for a judge who was hosting a settlement con-
ference to take steps to encourage a party to reconsider its position
if that party was about to accept a settlement that the judge be-
lieved was clearly unreasonable. 3 The court has taken no position
with respect to whether this majority view should determine how
evaluators handle this difficult dilemma. The court's inaction re-
sults from the fact that it has no evidence that evaluators have
actually confronted this situation or, if they have, that lawyers or
litigants have been upset by the way they have handled it.
The fact that the court has not received complaints that
evaluators are intruding into lawyer-client relationships or are up-
setting the balance of power between opponents does not mean
that the issues raised here can be ignored. The ENE program
clearly creates risks to values to which some members of the bar
ascribe great weight, values centering on the autonomy of lawyers
and on holding to a minimum the role neutral or public forces
should play in determining the results of lawsuits or settlement ne-
gotiations. It is significant, however, that ENE was designed by li-
tigators, not judges, and that it was at the behest of members of
the private bar, not government officials or judicial administrators,
that the court adopted this program. It also is significant that
upwards of 90 percent of the lawyers whose cases were forced into
the program during its second experimental stage favored ex-
panding it to more cases in federal court. Thus, it appears that a
significant segment of the bar either is not as enamored of auton-
omy values as we might have assumed or has concluded that ENE
poses only a modest threat to these values, a threat that is clearly
outweighed by the benefits the program is capable of delivering.
" Brazil, Settling Civil Suits at 139 (cited in note 3).
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4. Is There Bias or Discrimination in Determining Which Cases
are Designated for ENE?
Political considerations played no role whatsoever in the pro-
cess by which the task force and the court developed the criteria
for designating cases for ENE. Instead, these criteria are based
largely on lessons learned during the experimental stages of the
program and limitations in the program's resources.
The task force recommended, and the court decided, to ex-
clude cases involving pro se litigants because, during the experi-
mental stages, parties who were not represented by lawyers seemed
to have a great deal of difficulty understanding the purpose of the
ENE session and how it fit into the overall litigation scheme, ap-
peared not to understand the case assessments offered by the
evaluators, and seemed to feel a greater need than represented
parties to appear before a "real judge" in a "real courtroom," ei-
ther for cathartic purposes or to feel some confidence that their
rights were not being compromised.
The court decided to exclude cases in which the principal re-
lief sought is equitable, except certain declaratory relief actions
arising out of disputes over insurance coverage, on the theory that
such cases were more likely than others to require decisions of law
by the court and that they often would receive, early in the pretrial
period, closer judicial attention and management than other civil
matters. It seemed to follow that in such cases there would be less
need for the kinds of services ENE could provide and a greater
risk that the program could not deliver sufficient benefits to justify
the burdens that participation would entail. These considerations
also contributed to the court's decision to exclude from ENE most
matters arising under labor laws.
Similarly, the task force recommended excluding many kinds
of civil rights actions based on (1) a judgment that the parties are
more likely in these cases than in others to need or want a formal
pronouncement from the judiciary on a legal issue or matter of
public policy, and (2) a belief that there is an especially acute need
to preserve public confidence in the judicial process in such mat-
ters. ENE could pose some threat to these values because private
lawyers, rather than judges, play the neutral role and because of
the confidentiality that accompanies the ENE conference. The
court's decision not to exclude employment-based civil rights cases
was predicated in part on experience with such matters in the ex-
perimental stages of the program, where ENE made significant
contributions in some actions of this kind, and in part on the fact
that in many instances plaintiffs in such cases also rely extensively
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on common law contract and tort causes of action, matters to
which ENE has proved well suited.
In selecting categories of cases to presumptively include in
ENE, the court sought to assure that the program serviced a sub-
stantial number of the kinds of cases that are most common on the
court's docket and in which traditional litigation processes seem to
consume a great deal of the parties' resources. Thus, the court de-
cided that most cases based on contracts or personal injuries
should be eligible, unless they involved less than $150,000 in dam-
ages and therefore qualified for inclusion in the arbitration pro-
gram. The court also decided to make eligible cases sounding in
antitrust, securities, common law fraud, patent, copyright, or
trademark. Most of the larger cases on the court's docket fall in
these categories. The court felt that containing litigation expenses
can be especially difficult and important in larger cases, and, there-
fore, that contributions ENE might make to streamlining or ratio-
nalizing the case development process might be especially signifi-
cant in such matters.
The preceding paragraphs should make it clear that the court
is not channeling unpopular or politically controversial categories
of cases into ENE. Given concerns that inspire some critics of
ADR generally, it is significant that the court does not designate
for the ENE program prisoner petitions, cases arising under 42
USC § 1983, other civil rights cases that challenge governmental
conduct based on constitutional or statutory norms, cases involving
pro se litigants, social security actions, or government collection
matters, for example, student or veterans administration loans.
The ENE program simply is not vulnerable to charges that it is
designed to discourage the filing of unpopular kinds of cases, or to
push them out of the judicial mainstream, or to assure that they
receive less public attention and fewer public resources than com-
mercial disputes. If anything, ENE has the effect of freeing up
more public judicial resources to devote to the non-commercial
cases. Ironically, a criticism that might be more apt is that the case
selection criteria deprive some of the controversial or politically
sensitive cases of benefits that the court confers, through ENE, on
the mainstream cases that involve only money.
5. Is ENE a Second-Class Procedural Device, Promoting
Second-Class Justice?
I will not repeat here the comparison between disposition by
settlement and disposition by trial that I offered in the discussion
of the court's settlement program. Nor is it necessary to repeat the
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comparison between settlements reached with the aid of an exper-
ienced neutral with those reached without such assistance. It will
suffice here to point out that the principal purposes and the appar-
ent effects of ENE are to improve the quality of the communica-
tion, information and analysis on which the parties base their liti-
gation decisions. The surveys Professor Levine conducted showed
that most lawyers who had been exposed to ENE believed that the
process added to their information supply, improved their under-
standing of the issues, provided them with new insights and a fresh
perspective, and enhanced communication across party lines.
Moreover, 79 percent reported being either very satisfied (40 per-
cent) or somewhat satisfied (39 percent) with the procedure.
Eleven percent were somewhat dissatisfied and ten percent were
very dissatisfied. More significantly, 79 percent felt that the proce-
dure was "very fair", another 11 percent felt that it was somewhat
fair, and only six percent felt it was either somewhat unfair or very
unfair. Ninety percent reported that there was no bias at all on the
part of the evaluator, and 93 percent felt that the evaluator had
been either well prepared (54 percent) or adequately prepared (39
percent). It also is significant that almost 90 percent of Professor
Levine's lawyer-respondents felt that the ENE program ought to
be expanded to more cases. In the face of these figures it is difficult
to take seriously an argument that ENE is a second-class proce-
dural device to which parties feel relegated by an insensitive court.
In assessing concerns about "second-class" procedures it also
is important to bear in mind that no one is bound by any of the
results of any ENE conference, and that the court charges no fee
for the service that ENE represents.
While an evaluator's opinions about likelihood of liability and
probable range of damages are less likely to be reliable than the
findings of a judge or jury after a full trial, those opinions, and the
other information generated during an ENE conference, should in-
crease the reliability of judgments about the case made by the liti-
gators and clients. Since it is those judgments that play the deci-
sive roles in the disposition of most cases, ENE sessions should
have the effect of increasing the reliability of results in that vast
majority of cases that are disposed of without trial. Similarly, if
the alternative is a private negotiation without input from a neu-
tral person, the ENE procedure offers substantially better protec-
tion against the distortion of results that can be caused by imbal-
ances in the resources or skills of the lawyers or parties.
ENE also fares well when assessed in terms of other measures
of the value of dispute resolution procedures. It can reduce the
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cost and speed the pace of disposition. It tends to expand the
range of solution options for the parties to consider. It empowers
clients by insisting that they be present during the proceedings
and by permitting them to play major roles in the presentation of
their cases. It encourages counsel and parties to adopt a more
openly communicative, cooperative posture, both during the litiga-
tion and after its conclusion. It gives litigants and lawyers in-
creased opportunities to use the creative and constructive sides of
their personalities. It emphasizes reason as a predominant value in
resolving disputes. It exposes litigants and lawyers to much less
stress than a trial, perhaps even to less stress than private settle-
ment negotiations, where indirection, posturing and "power plays"
are more likely because of the absence of a knowledgeable neutral.
In the settlement component of the ENE program, litigants may
take into account many factors that would not play a role in deter-
mining outcome at a trial, like a defendant's cash flow problems.
Thus, by all of these measures of value, ENE arguably is superior
to disposition by trial or by private settlement negotiations.
III. NON-BINDING ARBITRATION UNDER LOCAL RULE 500
A. Why Was This Program Set Up?
The Northern District was one of three federal trial courts"'
that adopted similar experimental arbitration programs in 1978 in
response to an initiative by the Office for Improvements in the Ad-
ministration of Justice ("OIAJ"), a special unit of the Department
of Justice that Attorney General Griffin Bell created in 1977. At-
torney General Bell had been inspired by proceedings at the 1976
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with
the Administration of Justice (the "Pound Conference") and by
the work of its follow-up task force, which he chaired.35 He di-
rected the OIAJ, headed by Assistant Attorney General Daniel J.
Meador, to develop plans that interested district courts could fol-
low in adopting arbitration programs. Meador assigned Deputy As-
" The other two courts were the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, whose robust pro-
gram continues into the present, and the District of Connecticut, which replaced its pro-
gram in the early 1980s with other procedures designed to streamline dispute resolution and
encourage settlement in a broad range of cases. See E. Allan Lind and John E. Shapard,
Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration in Three Federal District Courts (Federal Judi-
cial Center, 1981).
11 Id at 1-2.
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sistant Attorney General Paul Nejelski to serve as the chief staff
person involved in the arbitration project."
In initiating and carrying out the work on this project, Attor-
ney General Bell and his staff at the Department of Justice were
motivated by two different but complementary purposes: (1) to
provide litigants with procedural means that would enable them to
resolve smaller, less complex cases faster and at less expense than
would be entailed if the matters were fully litigated to judgment,
and (2) to reduce docket pressures on federal district courts."
Of these two purposes, it appears that the first was by far the
more important. According to the first in a series of Federal Judi-
cial Center studies of the programs that were established as a re-
sult of the Justice Department initiative, the "goals of court-
annexed arbitration are to decrease the time and expense required
to dispose of civil litigation, without diminishing the actual or ap-
parent quality of justice."3 " That same study states that the "three
federal district courts implemented these rules in the belief that it
might be possible to improve upon the conventional procedures of
civil litigation for substantial numbers of lawsuits, in order to re-
duce delay, expense, and procedural complexity not warranted by
the matter in dispute." '39
In speeches delivered during 1977 and 1978, while the Justice
Department was developing plans for arbitration programs and
supporting legislation to extend their experimental adoption be-
yond the three original district courts, Mr. Nejelski declared that
the OIAJ was "attempting to develop means of expediting the res-
olution of all disputes-major and minor-without reducing the
quality of justice provided. . . . The organizing goal is 'to assure
access to effective justice for all citizens.' "0 In the same remarks,
Mr. Nejelski urged that it was time to "stop calling the people's
business junk and start realizing that 'minor' disputes are major
disputes to the parties involved and, when taken collectively, con-
stitute a major portion of the total workload. We need to devise
" Letter to the author from Professor Meador, May 8, 1989.
17 Letter from Professor Meador and Letter to the author from Paul Nejelski, August 4,
1989.
" Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at viii, 1, 5 (cited in note
34).
", Id at 1.
40 Text of Speech by Paul Nejelski at the National Conference on Minor Disputes Res-
olution at Columbia University in New York City, May 26, 1977, page 10 (copy in author's
possession), reprinted in part in Paul Nejelski, No More Second Class Courts, 16 Judges'
Journal 34 (1977), and in part in Paul Nejelski, Do Minor Disputes Deserve Second-Class
Justice?, 61 Judicature 102 (1977).
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ways to give them visibility and for the system to treat them seri-
ously.""' These are not the sentiments of a person who wants to
relegate smaller disputes to a "second-class" system of justice.
Rather, Mr. Nejelski believed that a pivotal objective of the OIAJ
was to rescue smaller disputes from the second-class system to
which they already were too often relegated.42
The inference that the other purpose that inspired the arbitra-
tion programs, that is, reducing "the burden these cases place on
court resources, '"" was secondary to the primary purpose of deliv-
ering a better dispute resolution product to litigants in smaller
cases is supported by the fact that "the potential influence of arbi-
tration on federal pilot court backlogs is necessarily slight, because.
the cases to which the rules apply represent a small proportion of
case load. And ...access to trial in the pilot districts does not
appear to be impeded by congestion."" Thus, at least in the three
courts that agreed to sponsor pilot programs in 1978, even the goal
of reducing delay was not, likely to prove significant. In these
courts the principal promise of the court-annexed nonbinding arbi-
tration programs was that they might enable litigants to resolve
their cases at less expense than they would incur if the matters
were fully litigated.
The Justice Department and the three district courts decided
that it was appropriate to launch these programs only on a limited
and experimental basis because they recognized the possibility that
these programs could have negative effects that might outweigh
the benefits they actually delivered. The earliest Federal Judicial
Center study noted that the arbitration programs might "result in
dissatisfaction with the quality of justice or severe increases in liti-
gation expense for some cases, that the arbitration hearings
[might] be used only as devices for discovery, or simply that the
rules [might] be ineffectual and thus add a new layer of complexity
and inconvenience to the litigation process." '45 Because no one
could be positive whether, on balance, these new procedures would
be beneficial to litigants, the Justice Department and the courts
asked the Federal Judicial Center to analyze, independently, as
many of the effects of the arbitration programs as possible. The
" Nejelski Speech at 17-18 (cited in note 40).
4" For additional information about OIAJ's contribution to the design of the arbitration
experiments, see Paul Nejelski, Court-Annexed Arbitration, 14 The Forum 215 (1978).
"3 Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at 5 (cited in note 34).
" Id at 4.
11 Id at 5.
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Center's commitment to this work is reflected in a series of reports,
three of which have included substantial data about the program
in northern California. The results of these studies are discussed in
a subsequent section.
The OIAJ developed model arbitration rules. Each of the
three district courts that participated in the pilot program modi-
fied the model to fit local conditions and preferences."' The first
section of the current version of Local Rule 500, which governs the
program in the Northern District of California, declares that its
purpose "is to establish a less formal procedure for the just, effi-
cient and economical resolution of controversies involving moder-
ate amounts of money damages while preserving the right to a full
trial. 4 7
B. How Does the Northern District's Nonbinding Arbitration
Program Operate?
The court's arbitration program (1) is mandatory for certain
kinds of cases, (2) yields awards that are not binding, and (3) is
free, meaning that the court charges no fee to litigants whose cases
go through the program. The arbitrators are paid modest fees with
funds provided by Congress.48
By written stipulation, parties may voluntarily submit their
case to the court's arbitration program, regardless of the subject
matter of the action, nature of the relief sought, or amount in con-
troversy.4" Such stipulations are reached in relatively few cases,
however, so the vast majority of suits that enter the arbitration
track do so under the compulsion of Local Rule 500. Under the
criteria set forth in that rule, actions are automatically designated
for arbitration if they sound in contract, personal injury or prop-
erty damage, if the only relief sought is monetary damages, and if
the amount in controversy does not exceed $150,000, exclusive of
any punitive or exemplary award that might be entered and of in-
terest and costs. Matters in which the United States is plaintiff are
not designated for arbitration, nor are actions predicated on con-
stitutional norms or on statutes protecting civil rights. Between
46 Id at 99-118.
" ND Cal LR 500-1.
48 Pursuant to changes that became effective in mid-1989, arbitrators are paid $250 for
each day (or portion thereof) of hearing in which they serve as a single arbitrator, or $150
for each day of hearing in which they serve as a member of a panel of three arbitrators. ND
Cal LR 500-4(d).
" ND Cal LR 500-8.
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July 1, 1989, and February 1, 1990, cases that met the criteria for
inclusion in the arbitration program constituted 16.5 percent of the
court's civil filings.50 The mix of cases that meet the criteria for
mandatory inclusion in the arbitration track varies over time, as
the mix of cases filed varies, but contract actions generally account
for a larger percentage of arbitration cases than personal injury ac-
tions, while suits based on property damage represent a very small
percentage of these cases.51
A party may petition the assigned judge to remove a case from
the arbitration track on the ground that the matter "involves novel
or complex factual issues, that legal issues predominate over fac-
tual issues, or other ...good cause." The assigned judge will re-
move the case if he or she concludes, after such a showing or sua
sponte, that compelling the action to remain in the program
"would not achieve the objectives of arbitration. '52 Such petitions
are filed relatively rarely. And while there undoubtedly is a range
of attitudes toward such motions among the judges, it probably is
fair to say that in most instances a party who is trying to have a
case removed from the arbitration program faces an uphill fight.
Even though cases that meet Local Rule 500's criteria are
"designated" for arbitration at the time the complaint is filed, ad-
ministrative action by court staff to move the matter toward the
hearing does not commence until the case is "at issue," meaning
that all defendants have filed responsive pleadings. The Federal
Judicial Center's most recent study, which covers cases filed be-
tween October 1, 1984, and December 31, 1985, indicates that the
"0 This percentage is higher by about five percent than was the case for many years.
The change appears to be attributable to two relatively recent amendments to Local Rule
500: (1) in November 1988, the court raised the ceiling for the size of cases subject to
mandatory arbitration from $100,000 to $150,000, and (2) in the late summer of 1989, the
court wrote into the Local Rule a rebuttable presumption that the real amount in contro-
versy in every civil case that falls within the subject matter jurisdiction of the arbitration
program is $150,000 or less.
In calculating the percentage of the court's civil docket that the arbitration program
reaches we have excluded routine government collection actions, for example, those arising
out of student loans, actions filed under the social security laws, forfeiture or penalty actions
filed under specialized regulatory proVisions, for example, of food and drug laws, and pris-
oner petitions. If all civil filings were included in the calculation, cases designated for arbi-
tration would constitute about 12 percent of the court's current civil docket. See note 9.
"' Of cases designated for arbitration between October 1, 1984, and December 31, 1985,
74 percent sounded in contract, 24 percent sounded in personal injury, with the remainder
falling into several different categories. Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern
District at 4-6 (cited in note 15). By comparison, on February 1, 1990, 55 percent of the
pending arbitration cases sounded in contract and 40 percent sounded in tort. See note 9.
ND Cal LR 500-3(c).
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median time between filing and at-issue for cases in the arbitration
track is about four months. It is quite significant, however, that 59
percent of the cases that were designated for the arbitration track
during the study period never reached the "at-issue" stage; they
were terminated before all parties had filed responsive pleadings.
The terminations were by voluntary dismissal, remand to state
court, settlement, or following an order by the court, for example,
finding no jurisdiction. Thus, only 41 percent of the cases that
were designated for arbitration at the time of filing survived long
enough to begin moving toward an arbitration hearing.53 An
equally significant statistic, that only about 15 percent of the cases
originally designated for the arbitration track remain in the system
long enough to have an arbitration hearing, will be discussed in
subsequent sections.
Private lawyers make up the pool of arbitrators who serve in
this program. Until mid-1989, the qualifications required of law-
yers who sought to join the pool were not demanding. Under the
former rule, a lawyer was eligible for selection by the court as long
as he or she had been a member of the California bar for five years
and had been admitted to practice in the District court. "When the
program first began, arbitrators were solicited through both letters
from the chief judge and public notice in the local legal newspa-
per. ' ' 54 This process generated a pool of about two hundred appli-
cants. Apparently, the court did not conduct any additional in-
quiry into the background of applicants, or exercise independent
judgment about their suitability to serve. When it launched the
program, the court seems to have felt that clearly unqualified per-
sons would be prevented from serving by the process, explained
below, through which counsel and the court selected the arbitra-
tors for particular cases. As new judges joined the court, however,
some concern about quality control arose. That concern inspired
the court to adopt more demanding requirements in mid-1989 and
to launch plans for a substantial training program -for arbitrators.
Under the new requirements, lawyers are not added to the pool
unless they have been admitted to practice for not less than ten
years, have been admitted to practice in the District court, and
"either (i) have committed for not less than five years 50 percent
or more of [their] professional time to matters involving litigation,
or (ii) have had substantial experience serving as a 'neutral' in dis-
pute resolution proceedings, or (iii) have had substantial experi-
" Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 7, 8 (cited in note 15).
64 Id at 51.
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ence negotiating consensual resolutions to complex problems. 55
To assure compliance with these requirements, the court collects
data on a questionnaire from all applicants for the evaluator pool.
The collection of that data, and the implementation of the new
training program, should go far toward alleviating concerns about
quality control.
The process of selecting an arbitrator, or a panel of three arbi-
trators, begins when a case reaches the at-issue stage. Under the
Local Rule, the court presumes that each case will be heard by a
single arbitrator unless all parties to the action join in a written
request for a panel of three arbitrators. Such joint requests are
made in about one-third of the cases. The selection process in any
given case begins by a staff person in the clerk's office sending to
all parties a list consisting of the names of the ten lawyers in the
evaluator pool who are next in line to be called to serve. Each side
is permitted to strike from this list two names: first plaintiff strikes
one name, then defendant strikes one, then plaintiff strikes an-
other, followed by defendant exercising its last strike. At this junc-
ture, the parties rank the remaining names in descending order of
preference. In constructing the ranking, the parties take turns ad-
ding one name at a time to the list, this time beginning with de-
fendant. The parties are to submit the six-name list to the clerk's
office within ten days; if they fail to do so, the court staff selects
the arbitrator or arbitrators, at random, from the list of ten names
that was sent to the parties. If the parties have submitted a ranked
list, as they do in most cases, the clerk's office approaches the can-
didates in the order they are ranked, designating the first person,
or first three persons, that agree to serve. More often than not, the
first people asked agree to serve, but occasionally a candidate will
not be available at the appropriate time or will have a conflict of
interest.
Interestingly, the only objective evidence that has been gath-
ered does not support an inference that either results of arbitration
hearings or quality of deliberations are likely to vary with the
number of arbitrators. Although precise data is not available, ad-
ministrators of the program report that split decisions from three-
arbitrator panels are a rarity. There may be sociological pressure
on arbitrators working in a panel to arrive at a consensus finding,
but one would expect split decisions with greater frequency if, for
example, arbitrators whose private practices revolved primarily
"5 ND Cal LR 500-4(a).
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around plaintiff's work tended to make appreciably different judg-
ments about liability or damages than arbitrators whose private
practices consisted largely of defense work. It also is noteworthy
that the most recent study by the Federal Judicial Center found
that "there was no difference in frequency of [demands for trial de
novo after an arbitration hearing] based on the number of arbitra-
tors. Likewise, for the de novo demand cases that have closed, the
number of arbitrators did not affect the rate at which the cases
reached trial."56 There certainly is nothing in this data that would
support an inference that parties whose cases are heard by only
one arbitrator are more likely to feel dissatisfied with the proce-
dure or the result than parties whose cases are heard by a panel of
three arbitrators.
The court orders the arbitration hearing to be held within 120
days after receiving from the parties their ranked list of arbitra-
tors.5" This period is set aside to permit the parties to conduct ad-
ditional investigations and complete at least the core discovery.
Despite the rule that continuances of the hearing date are to be
granted only for "extreme and unanticipated emergencies,"58 the
median time from at-issue to hearing date has been about five
months." Thus, the median time between the filing of the com-
plaint and the arbitration hearing has been about nine months. By
way of comparison, it appears that the median time between the
filing of a complaint and the commencement of trial for all civil
cases in the Northern District is at least 18 to 20 months.60 This
" Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 10 (cited in note 15).
" ND Cal LR 500-5(a).
" Id.
" Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 9-10. A provision that
was added to Local Rule 500 in mid-1989 in response to a Congressional mandate may have
the effect of increasing the time between joinder of issues and hearing. As required by the
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, 28 USC §§ 651-658 (1988), Local
Rule 500-5(a) provides that "unless the parties consent, or unless the assigned judge orders
otherwise for good cause, no arbitration hearing may commence until 30 days after disposi-
tion by the court of any motion to dismiss the complaint, motion for judgment on the plead-
ings, motion to join necessary parties, or motion for summary judgment, provided such mo-
tion was filed and served within 30 days after the filing of the last responsive pleading."
60 Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Federal Court Management Sta-
tistics, 1988 127. This source indicates that the median time from "issue to trial" was about
16 months for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1988. Although precise data is not available, it
appears reasonable to assume that the median time from filing a complaint to receipt of an
answer for all civil cases filed in the Northern District is at least two months and more likely
between four and five months. See Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern Dis-
trict at 8.
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means that an arbitration is likely to occur almost a year earlier
than a trial.
As noted above, only about 15 percent of the cases designated
for arbitration at the time of filing ever reach the hearing stage.
The others are either (1) removed from the program or consoli-
dated with other matters (approximately ten percent of the cases
originally designated for arbitration) or (2) disposed of prior to
hearing (about 75 percent of the cases originally designated for ar-
bitration). 1 While the figure may be rising slightly because of re-
cent increases in the program's jurisdictional ceiling, over the al-
most 12 years that the program has been in operation, the number
of arbitration hearings per year has averaged only about 60. This
represents two percent or less of pending civil cases in any given
year.2 As these figures suggest, arbitration hearings play a direct
role in the resolution of only a small portion of the cases on the
court's docket.
Most arbitration hearings are conducted in the relatively in-
formal setting of a private law office. The most recent Federal Ju-
dicial Center study indicates that a plaintiff is present in about 90
percent of the hearings, but that defendants are present only about
60 percent of the time. 3 The subpoena power may be used to com-
pel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documentary
evidence for these hearings. Testimony is taken under oath,
through direct and cross-examination, but the rules of evidence
serve only as guides and probably are not rigorously enforced. Wit-
nesses testify at the vast majority of these hearings, but parties
present documentary evidence less often, perhaps in about half of
the sessions." Parties are permitted to have the proceedings re-
corded and transcribed, but the circumstances under which such
matter could be used at a subsequent trial are not fully
predictable. 5
61 Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 7-8 (cited in note 15).
62 In making this calculation, we have excluded government collection actions, social
security matters, and prisoner petitions. Because the profile of the court's civil caseload
varies somewhat from year to year, percentages like the one presented in the text are
approximations.
OS Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 55.
64 Id at 54-55.
Following the mandate of the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of
1988, 28 USC § 655(c), Local Rule 500-7(b), states that "[tlhe court shall not admit at the
trial de novo any evidence that there has been an arbitration proceeding, the nature or
amount of any award, or any other matter concerning the conduct of the arbitration pro-
ceeding, unless (i) the evidence would otherwise be admissible in the court under the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, or (ii) the parties have otherwise stipulated." Until amended in mid-
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The arbitrator's role is not to mediate or otherwise attempt to
settle the case. Instead, arbitrators are to preside over proceedings
that are essentially adversarial, even if less formal than a trial, to
consider the evidence, then to render the functional equivalent of a
judgment on the merits, applying legal principles to the admitted
evidence just as such principles would be applied by a judge in a
bench trial. The arbitrator's "award" reflects his or her view of the
full entitlements of the parties under the law. An arbitrator may
answer the question of liability only with a "yes" or "no." Any
damage award is not to reflect a compromise and is not the same
as the "settlement value" of the case-the latter would reflect not
only guesses about the probability of particular results at trial, but
also factors not relevant to the merits, for example, the ability of
the defendant to make payments. An arbitrator's award is sealed
and not made known to the assigned judge while the case remains
pending. Unless a timely demand is made for trial de novo, the
award becomes the final judgment in the case. The Local Rule does
not contemplate arbitrators playing any role in any settlement ne-
gotiations that might occur after the hearing.
The outcome of the arbitration hearing is not binding, and has
no formal effect on how the case is resolved," if, within 30 days of
entry of the award, any party to the arbitration proceeding files a
demand for a trial de novo. Amendments to Local Rule 500 that
took effect in mid-1989 eliminated even the remote possibility of a
party suffering any court-imposed penalty for exercising its right
to a trial de novo. Before the court adopted these recent amend-
ments, Local Rule 500-7(c) permitted, but did not require, the as-
signed judge to assess costs, but not attorneys' fees, against a party
who demanded a trial de novo but failed to secure a judgment that
was more favorable than the arbitrator's award. This provision had
been included in the rule in an attempt to discourage thoughtless
demands for trial de novo. There was no evidence, however, that
the specter of being penalized as the Rule provided had any such
effect. Any power to deter that such a rule might otherwise have
had was seriously compromised by at least three facts: (1) the
items that fell within the definition of "costs" were not likely, in
most cases, to add up to large sums, (2) imposition of the penalty
1989, the Local Rule permitted parties to use at trial testimony given at an earlier arbitra-
tion hearing only for purposes of impeachment, absent a stipulation permitting other uses.
" The arbitration award may have a significant informal affect on disposition of the
case by playing a visible role in settlement negotiations that later occur directly between the
parties.
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was discretionary, and (3) at the time they filed their de novo de-
mands, most counsel presumably knew that the odds of the case
actually ending up in trial, as opposed to being settled after the
arbitration but before trial, were extremely small. In deciding not
to include any penalty provision in the amended Local Rule, the
court also felt it was significant that the percentage of arbitrated
cases in which a de novo demand is made is virtually identical in
northern California and eastern Pennsylvania, even though in the
latter court the potential penalty facing a litigant who does not
improve his or her position at trial is clearly fixed and quite
small.6 7 Because it did not want to infringe upon constitutional
rights to trial, the court did not even consider changing its rule in
the direction of imposing more severe financial penalties, like at-
torneys' fees, on parties whose positions were not improved by
judgment after trial.6 8
The timely filing of a demand for a trial de novo returns the
case to the assigned judge, who moves it toward trial in accordance
with his or her own policies. While no rule of court gives such mat-
ters trial priority, a few of the judges attempt to give these cases
earlier trial dates than they might otherwise be given. The priority
generally given to criminal matters, however, and commitments al-
ready made to older civil suits, often mean that cases that have
been through the arbitration track do not reach trial for many
months after the de novo demand is filed.69 It appears, nonethe-
less, that the median time from the filing of the complaint to the
commencement of trial is a little shorter for cases that have gone
through the arbitration track than for other civil matters.7
67 Barbara Meierhoefer, Court-Annexed Arbitration in the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania 7, 52 (Federal Judicial Center, 1988).
" In any event, Congress foreclosed the possibility of using the specter of large finan-
cial penalties to deter pointless demands for trial de novo by strictly limiting both the
amounts of any such penalties and the circumstances under which they could be imposed.
See the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, 28 USC § 655(d) and (e).
" See Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 9 (cited in note
15).
'0 For arbitration cases, the median time from the filing of the last answer to com-
mencement of trial has been about 14 months, id at 9, whereas for all civil cases in the
Northern District the median time from the filing of the first answer to commencement of
trial was about 16 months for the year ending June 30, 1988, Federal Court Management
Statistics, 1988 at 127 (cited in note 60), and 14 months for the year ending June 30, 1989,
Federal Court Management Statistics, 1989 127. The figures for all civil cases include rou-
tine simple matters like student loan collection actions and review of social security deci-
sions, so the median time for resolution probably understates the time periods required in
the mainstream of cases.
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Moreover, in assessing the significance of any such delays, it is
important to bear in mind that most of the cases where a de novo
demand is made are resolved by settlement negotiations in which
the parties engage during the weeks following the arbitration hear-
ing. In fact, only ten percent of the cases in which a de novo de-
mand is made actually end up in trial.71 As significant, only one to
two percent of the cases originally designated for the arbitration
track end up in trial. This very low rate of going to trial reduces
considerably the significance of the fact that the arbitrator's award
formally becomes the final judgment only in about 40 percent of
the matters that proceed through the hearing stage-a demand for
a trial de novo is filed in more than half of the cases that are
arbitrated. 2
Interestingly, tort cases are more likely than contract cases to
reach the hearing stage, to have a de novo demand filed, and to
actually go to trial. 3 At least two factors may help account for the
fact that the tort cases are more difficult to resolve consensually:
(1) it can be much more difficult to predict the damages value of a
tort case than of a contract case, in part because ascribing value to
"general damages," like pain and suffering, is such an elusive exer-
cise, and (2) plaintiffs in tort cases are more likely to be people
who do not have experience in litigation and who may, therefore,
be less realistic about possible outcomes than a business or institu-
tional litigant, which is more likely to be a plaintiff in an action
sounding in contract.
C. Does the Arbitration Program Work? Does It Achieve the
Ends for Which It Was Designed?
The absence of any "control group" of cases against which to
compare the cases that have been assigned to the court's arbitra-
tion program makes it impossible to know with confidence whether
the arbitration system results in cases being resolved less expen-
sively or more quickly than they otherwise would be. While consid-
ering, in the paragraphs that follow, the data that sheds some light
on these difficult questions, however, we should not lose sight of
the fact that it is almost indisputable that arbitration procedures
can be used to achieve these ends when both sides of a case are
proceeding in good faith and truly want to resolve their dispute as
7' Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 7, 10, 12 (cited in note
15).
72 Id at 7, 10. See also note 9.
71 Id at 12-13.
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quickly and as cost-effectively as possible. The arbitration proce-
dure, just like early neutral evaluation, clearly provides the parties
to any particular action with tools that they otherwise would not
have and that they can use, if both sides are so inclined, to stream-
line and expedite disposition of their case.
While the Federal Judicial Center found, in studies conducted
in the early 1980s, that the arbitration programs in the federal
courts in Connecticut and in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
reduced the time that elapsed between filing and disposition, the
researchers could find no clear support for a conclusion that the
program in Northern California had a similarly positive effect.7'
On the other hand, most of the lawyers who responded to Federal
Judicial Center questionnaires in these early studies believed that
the fact that their cases had been assigned to the arbitration track
resulted in earlier dispositions than otherwise would have oc-
curred.7' And in the surveys conducted later in the 1980s, only 21
percent of the responding lawyers in cases where a de novo de-
mand had been made felt that arbitration delayed resolution of the
case.
76
It appears that the principal reason that the, arbitration pro-
gram may speed disposition is that the date of the hearing is likely
to be appreciably earlier than a firm trial date. The median time
between the filing of the last answer and the date of an arbitration
hearing is just over five months," while the median time between
the filing of the first answer and commencement of trial is about
16 months.78 The earlier imminence of that arbitration event forces
counsel to complete the core aspects of their investigative and dis-
covery work earlier than they otherwise would, thus equipping
7, Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at 47-50, 76-77 (cited in
note 34).
71 Id at 61, 77.
76 Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 29 (cited in note 15).
Generalizing from these figures may not be safe, however, because only 43 lawyers re-
sponded to this particular question.
7 Id at 9.
"8 Federal Court Management Statistics, 1988 at 127 (cited in note 60). See also Lind
& Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at 78-83 (cited in note 34). Differ-
ences in the way data has been collected by the Administrative Office and by the clerks in
our court, as well as the Federal Judicial Center, force us to make this awkward comparison
of time between filing the last answer and hearing (for arbitration cases) and between first
answer and trial (for all cases). Data for the period July 1, 1988, to June 30, 1989, suggest
that the time between first answer and trial for all civil cases decreased to about 14 months.
Federal Court Management Statistics, 1989 at 127 (cited in note 70). Because control over
how such data is generated is far from perfect, such figures represent only rough
approximations.
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them to engage in meaningful settlement negotiations earlier.
Moreover, the simple fact that the arbitration event is looming
seems to move counsel to initiate settlement discussions that oth-
erwise would not occur until the trial date looms.79 Further, law-
yers in cases that proceed through a hearing report that it tends to
inspire settlement negotiations earlier than otherwise would occur
and that the arbitrator's award tends to be a good starting point
for settlement discussions."
Most lawyers whose cases have been sent to the arbitration
program believe that it reduced both their time expenditures and
the financial burdens of litigation on their clients .8 As the most
recent of the Federal Judicial Center studies notes, "[o]ver 60 per-
cent of the attorneys in arbitration cases indicated that they spent
less time, their clients spent less time, and the cost to their clients
was less than if the case had gone through normal steps to trial."8
While these opinion surveys cannot prove, in the way that a con-
trolled experiment involving large numbers of cases might, that the
net effect of the arbitration program on the cost of litigation is
positive, they are the only evidence on point that is currently avail-
able and are consistent with the effects one-would expect from a
program that reduces overall time to disposition.
Since it seems fair to assume that the total cost of disposition
to clients is greater for cases resolved through trial than for cases
resolved short of trial, the effect that arbitration programs have on
the trial rate, that is, the percentage of cases that proceed all the
way through trial, is a matter of some significance. Because no con-
trolled experiments have been conducted, however, we cannot an-
swer this question with confidence. Nonetheless, there is some data
in studies conducted by the Federal Judicial Center in the early
1980s that suggest, albeit guardedly, that the arbitration tracks in
federal courts might reduce the trial rate for the kinds of cases
that are subject to these programs by as much as 50 percent.8 It is
possible that figure could be even higher today, given the fact that
the trial rate for arbitration cases declined even further after the
first Federal Judicial Center study was completed, from 3.8 per-
cent to 1.4 percent.8 4 There are at least two complicating factors,
19 Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 24-25.
80 Id at 25, 29.
8 Id at 21, 24, 25. See also Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration
at 61 (cited in note 34).
8 Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 21 (cited in note 15).
" Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at 138-40.
8' Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 5.
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however, that make it impossible to reach firm conclusions based
on this data. One is that there appears to have been at least a
slight decrease in the overall trial rate for all civil cases since the
early 1980s. The second factor we must bear in mind is that tort
cases; which tend to be more prone than contract cases to proceed
all the way to trial, made up a larger percentage of the arbitration
caseload during the early study period than during the more recent
study period. Thus, the apparent dramatic reduction in the overall
trial rate may be attributable, at least in part, to differences in the
mix of cases in the arbitration track during the different periods.
In this regard, it is noteworthy that the current mix of cases in the
arbitration program is much closer to the mix that was the subject
of the early Federal Judicial Center study than to the mix that was
the subject of the more recent study. Currently, about 40 percent
of the arbitration cases sound in tort. For the period covered by
the first study, about 43 percent sounded in tort. For the period.
covered by the more recent study, in contrast, only 24 percent of
the matters in the arbitration track sounded in tort.85
Another purpose, even though secondary, of the arbitration
programs was to reduce docket pressures in federal courts. To the
extent that the arbitration system reduces the trial rate, it also
reduces docket pressures. For several reasons, however, the arbitra-
tion program in the Northern District of California, at least as cur-
rently designed, is capable of relieving docket pressures only mod-
estly. Figures for the latter of half of 1989 and early 1990 indicate
that we can expect about 15 percent of the civil cases filed in the
Northern District to fall within the jurisdictional reach of Local
Rule 500. Somewhere between 600 and 730 cases will be designated
for arbitration annually. Ten to 15 percent of these will be re-
moved from the program, leaving 500 to 620 cases to be affected
annually by operation of Local Rule 500. While that is not an in-
significant figure, there remain at any given time between 2500 and
350016 other civil cases pending on the court's docket. Moreover,
the kinds of matters that the rule reaches tend to be smaller and
less complex than many. of the matters left unaffected by the rule.
Smaller, less complex cases tend to consume less of the court's re-
sources than their larger, more complex counterparts, and the
" Id at 4-6; Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at 34.
86 These figures change from time to time as the profile of matters filed moves. As
indicated elsewhere, I exclude from such figures routine government collection actions, so-
cial security "matters, and prisoner petitions.
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smaller cases apparently are more likely to be resolved prior to
trial.8 7
As noted at the beginning of this section, the designers of the
arbitration programs for federal courts wanted the new procedures
to reduce delay and cost "without diminishing the actual or appar-
ent quality of justice."88 Since discussion of whether these court-
annexed arbitration programs have succeeded by this measure
overlaps so extensively with consideration of whether they re-
present a form of "second-class justice," I will take up these issues
together in the next section.
D. Is the Arbitration Program Vulnerable to Criticisms That
Have Been Voiced about Court-Sponsored ADR Generally?
1. Does the Arbitration Program Represent an Abdication of
the Judicial Function?
Is the arbitration program promoted by lazy judges who hope
it will enable them to avoid some of their work? The initiative for
establishing the arbitration program did not come from judges. In-
stead, it came from lawyers and law professors working in the Jus-
tice Department during the Carter administration. After the basic
design of the program had been developed, Justice Department of-
ficials searched out a few courts that were willing to volunteer to
participate in a limited experiment. Thus, court-annexed arbitra-
tion in the federal system is not the brainchild of judicial officers,
but of lawyers and law professors interested in procedural reform.
After being asked to sponsor the program on an experimental
basis, the hope that arbitration would shorten the line of cases
needing attention must have gone through more than one judge's
mind, but no sensible judge could expect this program to have a
dramatic impact on the number of hours he or she is required to
work or the size of his or her docket. At any given time each active
judge in the Northern District has between 250 and 450 cases on
his or her civil docket, some 25 to 45 of which are likely to be in
the arbitration track. In addition, each judge is assigned a substan-
tial number of criminal matters, many of which require considera-
ble attention. Thus, no matter what happens to the arbitration
cases that have been assigned to any particular judge, the queue of
", Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at 138-140 (cited in note
88 Id at xii.
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cases will remain very long and he or she will have far more work
to do than could be accomplished on any sensible schedule.
Through the arbitration program, do judges delegate judicial
functions to private lawyers who do not have appropriate qualifica-
tions for this work? Arbitrators working under Local Rule 500 have
no case-dispositive power. They cannot hear and decide motions
on pleadings or for summary judgment. They cannot enter dismis-
sals. They cannot impose a judgment on any litigant. Nor do they
have power to control pretrial case development, to compel discov-
ery, or to fix litigation schedules. They are empowered only to pre-
side at the arbitration hearing, to order issuance of subpoenas to
compel witnesses to appear or documents to be presented at the
hearing, to determine which of the proffered evidence is considered
there, and to enter an award that is, for all practical purposes,
merely advisory. Because the results of arbitration under Local
Rule 500 are not binding and are not communicated to the judge
who would preside at trial, and because the parties' right to pro-
ceed to a de novo trial remains fully intact, it is clear that ultimate
responsibility for any non-consensual disposition of cases assigned
to the arbitration track remains with the judges. Thus, despite the
fact that the role the arbitrators play at the hearing is judicial in
character, it cannot be fairly said that the arbitrators displace the
judges or wield the powers that our constitutional system envisions
being wielded only by publicly-appointed judicial officers.
There is, however, one respect in which the court's arbitration
program encourages some relaxation of judicial attention that cases
otherwise would receive. While there is nothing in Local Rule 500
that compels judges to adjust in any way the case management
rules and procedures they normally apply to civil matters, some of
the judges sometimes do not hold some of the early status and case
development planning conferences in cases that are designated for
the arbitration track that they hold in other civil actions.8 9 Thus,
' This statement is based primarily on information provided by clerk's office personnel
in mid-1989. Data gathered by the Federal Judicial Center in 1985 and 1986 prompted the
authors of the report that was published in 1988 to suggest that "judges in the Northern
District of California involve themselves in arbitration cases as much as they do in other
civil matters" and that the "level of involvement depends more on the judge than on the
type of case." Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the'Northern District at 15-16 (cited in
note 15). This conclusion is at odds, modestly, both with more current information gathered
in the preparation of this article and with some of the data reported in the Federal Judicial
Center study itself. For example, the authors of that study reported that two of the then
active judges stated that they have no involvement with cases designated for the arbitration
track until after the arbitration hearing. The requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 16, however, result in judges holding some kind of initial status or scheduling confer-
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for arbitration-track cases, sometimes judges postpone their initial
Rule 16 conferences until after the arbitration hearing. When no
initial status conference is held, or when such a conference- is com-
pleted perfunctorily, there is no occasion for the judge to offer
guidance about discovery and motion practice, to fix cut-off dates,
or to help with planning the case development process with an eye
toward settlement. This lack of judicial guidance would be a poten-
tially serious problem if the arbitration rules did not impose rela-
tively firm deadlines for completing discovery (20 days prior to the
date set for the hearing) and for commencing the arbitration itself
(no more than 130 days after the matter is at-issue). These dead-
lines, coupled with the fact that most of the cases designated for
arbitration are relatively small and straightforward, lead some
judges to conclude that in some arbitration cases there is little
need for active judicial intervention early in the pretrial period. On
the other hand, it is probable that early judicial intervention, in
the form of a Rule 16 conference, in some of the cases designated
for the arbitration track would mobilize lawyers' energies and focus
their attention in ways that would lead to early disposition, avoid-
ing unnecessary discovery and the arbitration hearing. More care-
ful judicial monitoring of arbitration cases also might result in
fewer instances of postponement of the arbitration hearing well be-
yond the time frames contemplated in Local Rule 500.90 It should
be emphasized, however, that practices among the judges vary con-
siderably, and that some arbitration cases get exactly the same
amount of early pretrial attention as civil matters that do not qual-
ify for the arbitration track.
Despite the fact that arbitrators have no case-dispositive
power, it is important that the persons who work in this quasi-
judicial capacity be well-qualified. Arbitrators in some measure re-
present the judicial system to the public. For limited purposes,
they are agents of the court. Moreover, the way they perform their
function, and the quality of the thinking that supports their advi-
sory judgments, can have a real effect on the outcome of the cases
ence in most of their civil cases. Moreover, since only about 15 percent of the cases that are
originally designated for the arbitration track ever reach the hearing stage, a policy of post-
poning all or most judicial involvement with a case until after an arbitration hearing would
result in there being no judicial contact whatsoever with the vast majority of cases desig-
nated for arbitration.
" It is disquieting that 20 of the 75 arbitration hearings held during 1988 and the first
half of 1989 occurred more than a year after the filing of the original complaint, according to
data compiled for the author by the Office of the Clerk of the Northern District of
California.
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in which they serve. If they preside over a sloppy, disrespectful
proceeding, they damage the credibility of the entire judicial pro-
cess. If the award they enter after a hearing is way out of line with
what is likely to occur at a trial, they can make prospects for sensi-
ble consensual disposition much worse than they would have been
without the hearing. So it is important that the people who serve
as arbitrators be well-qualified.
It is not clear, however, that the process the court used in the
past to appoint arbitrators provided sufficient quality control. As
noted earlier, until recently the only formal qualifications for ad-
mission to the pool of arbitrators were membership in the bar of
the court and admission to practice for more than five years. Dur-
ing the first decade of the program's operation, the court appar-
ently made no significant inquiry into other aspects of the appli-
cant's background, reputation or temperament. Instead, the court
chose to rely on the process by which members of the pool would
be selected to serve in given cases: the clerk's office would select at
random ten names from the pool, then the parties, through coun-
sel, could eliminate up to four names from that list before submit-
ting the remaining six names in an order of preference that they
fixed. This system certainly provides some screening to eliminate
the patently incompetent or biased members of the pool, but it is
not clear that it is a sufficient substitute for more demanding ex-
amination of applicants' qualifications and for a meaningful train-
ing program. If the quality of the pool as a whole is not clear, the
ability of litigants to screen out only some of the nominees may
provide too little assurance that the people left to serve are quali-
fied. Recognizing the need to address these concerns, the court re-
cently up-graded the requirements that applicants must satisfy to
join or remain in the pool91 and set in motion plans to conduct a
substantial training program for all its arbitrators.
Despite the arguable deficiencies in the level of control the
court has exercised in the past over the process by which lawyers
enter the arbitrator pool, it appears that most users of the arbitra-
tion system have been satisfied with the quality of the arbitrators'
performance. Most of the lawyers polled in the Federal Judicial
Center's studies believe that the arbitrators were impartial and ad-
equately prepared, that the parties were given ample opportunity
to present their sides of the case, and that the results of the arbi-
91 ND Cal LR 500-4(a).
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tration hearings were fair and reasonable. 2 Thus, the system
seems to have worked adequately even before the recent changes
designed to improve quality control.
Is the purpose or effect of this program to make it more diffi-
cult or more expensive for parties to get to trial, or to pressure
them to settle? The account, offered at the beginning of this sec-
tion, of the design of these programs by Justice Department law-
yers in the late 1970s should make it clear that the goal was to
make disposition of modest sized cases faster and less expensive,
not slower and more expensive. The objective was to streamline
the process, to "reduce delay, expense, and procedural complexity
not warranted by the matter in dispute. '93 Nor is there any reason
to believe that the judges who played active roles in bringing these
programs to the three pilot districts wanted to use them as barriers
to trial. In fact, the judges most connected with innovative pro-
grams like these in the three pilot districts, Robert F. Peckham,
Raymond J. Broderick, and Robert C. Zampano, are highly re-
garded for eschewing institutionally self-serving approaches and
for making statesmanlike commitments to the development and
support of procedures designed to serve the needs of clients and
counsel.
Arguments that these programs were designed to pressure liti-
gants to settle would be more persuasive if significant penalties
were imposed on parties who exercised their right to trial de novo.
Parties who exercise that right under the current version of Local
Rule 500, however, face no penalty whatsoever. Moreover, the pen-
alties such parties faced under older versions of the rule were quite
modest in size, were discretionary in the trial judge, and could be
triggered only if a party failed to obtain a more favorable result at
trial. Furthermore, every party, whether they had been in arbitra-
tion or not, who did not prevail on the liability issue at trial was
exposed to exactly the same "penalty" as a party who demanded a
trial de novo after an arbitration but failed to improve his position;
every loser on the liability issue was at risk of being assessed
"costs" within the meaning of Local Rule 265-1. Finally, as noted
above, there is no evidence that the possibility of being penalized
so modestly had any influence on parties' decisions about whether
to demand a trial de novo and take the case to judgment.
92 Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 26-28 (cited in note
15); Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at 58-69 (cited in note 34).
" Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at 1.
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Whether the arbitration programs have unintentionally had
the effect of increasing the cost of litigation is a more complex
question to address. In the relatively small percentage of cases that
only a trial will resolve, compulsory participation in arbitration
prior to trial adds a layer of arguably unproductive costs. Even for
such cases, however, there may be some cost-benefits from an arbi-
tration hearing. The hearing may expose an opponent's trial strat-
egy, serve as a substitute for some formal discovery, clarify issues,
sharpen counsel's understanding of strengths and weaknesses of
various elements of evidence, and/or serve as a rehearsal hall or
testing ground for arguments. In these ways, the arbitration can
reduce the cost of final trial preparation and can streamline the
presentation of the case at trial. Given that most matters in the
arbitration track are not overly complex, however, the economic
value of benefits like these may not be great. Moreover, the
surveys by the Federal Judicial Center show that the majority of
the lawyers whose cases have proceeded all the way to trial de novo
reported that they and their clients spent more time and money on
the matter than they would have if they had not gone through
arbitration."
It is imperative to recall, however, that only a tiny percent-
age-one to two percent-of the cases that are designated for the
arbitration track end up in trial. The vast majority of the cases so
designated never even reach the hearing stage. And, as noted
above, most of the lawyers whose cases have been concluded prior
to or at the hearing feel that assignment to the arbitration track
reduced, rather than increased, the amount of time and money
committed to the case.
2. Is the Underlying Purpose of the Arbitration Program to
Reduce Governmental Involvement in Defining and Enforcing the
Basic Rules of the Social Order?
There would be more substance to this concern if arbitration
reached either many more cases than it does or different categories
of actions. In the Northern District, however, arbitration reaches
only actions in which $150,000 or less is at issue. It does not reach
class actions. It does not reach any category of case that is not
based on contract, personal injury or property damage. Even cases
in these categories are to be exempted on a showing that they in-
volve novel or complex legal issues or significant and complex fac-
, Id at 61; Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 30.
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tual issues, or that legal issues predominate over factual issues.
The program does not reach any case in which equitable relief is
sought. 5 Thus, arbitration does not reach any of the socially sensi-
tive categories of cases that are based on the civil rights statutes or
any other specialized federal legislation. Nor does it interfere with
litigants' access to prompt judicial intervention based on exercise
of equitable powers.
The very limited reach of the program's jurisdiction means
that its capacity to remove the public courts from the process of
setting and enforcing the rules of the social order is quite limited.
It also is important to bear in mind here that, even if there were no
arbitration program, only a very small percentage of the cases that
fall within its jurisdiction would proceed all the way to trial. The
vast majority would be dismissed or settled by action of the par-
ties, in most instances without significant contact with the court in
any form. Moreover, because the results of arbitration hearings are
not binding, and because parties are not exposed to any penalty for
requesting trial de novo, the few cases that meet the criteria for
compelled participation in the program and that involve interests
or feelings significant enough to warrant trial will reach the public
adjudicative process.
Does the arbitration program increase the likelihood that both
the outcome of disputes, and the procedures used to resolve them,
will remain secret? An arbitration award that the parties permit to
become the final judgment in the case becomes a public document
just like judgments that follow trials. Awards that are not accepted
by the parties remain in the court's file, but the assigned judge
may not learn their content until after the case is terminated. 6
After termination of the case there is no rule-based obstacle to
public access to the content of the award.9 7 Thus, public access to
the results of arbitration hearings may not be substantially dissim-
ilar to public access to results of trials.
Local Rule 500 does not cloak in secrecy the proceedings at an
arbitration. As a practical matter, however, it is less likely that
members of the public will know that arbitration hearings are un-
derway, since they take place for the most part in the private of-
fices of the arbitrators and since no public notice announces the
dates on which they will occur. Thus, arbitrations under the Local
" The arguable exception is that actions arising under insurance contracts where the
relief sought is declaratory may be subject to arbitration.
0' ND Cal LR 500-6(d), conforming to the requirements of 28 USC § 654(b).
97 Id.
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Rule are considerably more likely to take place in private than are
trials. I am not aware of any instance, however, in which the press
or an interested non-party has sought but been denied an opportu-
nity to observe an arbitration under the Local Rule. I add quickly
that I cannot predict with confidence how the court would resolve
a dispute of this kind. Since there are only 60 to 65 arbitrations
per year under the Local Rule, however, and since none of the
matters arbitrated is based on civil rights or other socially sensitive
statutes, it is not clear that the reduced visibility of arbitration
proceedings is a matter of great consequence.
There is another way that the arbitration program might re-
duce public knowledge about how lawsuits are resolved. There
would be less public knowledge of such matters if the effect of the
program was to reduce the percentage of cases that are resolved by
trial and to increase the percentage of cases that are resolved by
private settlement, most often prior to the arbitration hearing.
While data available at this time do not permit firm conclusions
about the effect of the program on the trial rate, there is some
"soft" evidence, as noted earlier, that suggests that Local Rule 500
might reduce the percentage of cases disposed of by trial.
Several considerations, however, suggest that any increase in
the privatization of dispute resolution that accompanies the arbi-
tration program does not seriously threaten important societal in-
terests. Even if Local Rule 500 reduces the trial rate by 50 percent
for the kinds of cases subject to its jurisdiction, there probably are
only about 20 to 30 fewer trials per year in the Northern District,
or approximately two per judge.98 For a relatively large court, this
is not a substantial reduction in trials.
Moreover, the trials that do not occur are in contract or tort
cases of modest value, cases that, at least in the vast majority of
instances, neither implicate sensitive political values nor raise
novel legal questions. There is not likely to be much public interest
in the trial of these kinds of cases, and not having them go to trial
is not likely to harm the judicial system's capacity to refine prece-
dents or to establish new rules of law. Not having these trials also
is not likely to deprive society of important knowledge about itself,
or to deprive other potential plaintiffs of information that would
educate them about their rights and motivate them to attempt to
98 This estimate is based on an assumption that 600 to 650 cases will be designated
annually for the arbitration track and that the trial rate for cases of the kind subject to
Local Rule 500 would be three to six percent if there were no arbitration program. See Lind
& Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at 138-40 (cited in note 34).
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vindicate those rights through litigation. In considering the priva-
tization issue, it also is important to bear in mind that the arbitra-
tion rule does not cover a great many contract and tort cases, for
example, those where the amount in controversy exceeds $150,000.
Thus, there remain a large number of contract and tort cases that
are not subject to arbitration and that are available for public ad-
judication and to serve as fodder for the evolution of social
norms.
9
Does the arbitration program dangerously reduce pressure on
taxpayers and legislators to fund public courts at adequate levels?
This concern might be well-placed if arbitration programs reached
much farther into the courts' dockets and had the effect of remov-
ing much larger numbers of cases from the trial calendar. As cur-
rently structured in the Northern District, however, arbitration
reaches only about 15 percent of civil filings. And, as noted above,
the cases designated for arbitration are modest in size and less
likely than cases in categories not reached by the program to pro-
ceed all the way to trial. If the arbitration program did not exist,
only a small percentage of the relatively small cases it covers would
go to trial anyway, and trial of these smaller matters would not
impose a huge burden on judicial resources. Thus, the existence of
programs like the one in the Northern District cannot plausibly be
used to argue that there is less need for public support of courts.
3. Is the Arbitration Program Changing the Role of Judges
or the Character of the Court?
The existence of the arbitration program has little effect, di-
rectly or indirectly, on the roles judges play in the Northern Dis-
trict. Judges are not involved at all in the arbitration process. They
rarely are called upon to rule on motions arising out of the applica-
tion of arbitration rules. Some of the judges sometimes relax their
early pretrial case management efforts in cases that have been des-
ignated for arbitration, but this fact has no appreciable impact on
the way the judges handle the remaining 85 percent percent of
their civil docket.
Nor can it be argued that judges are using the private lawyers
who serve as arbitrators to make significant changes in the role
" In 1988, for example, available data suggest that there were approximately 1100 cases
filed in the Northern District that satisfied the subject matter jurisdiction requirements of
Local Rule 500, but only 447 of these cases were designated for arbitration (the amount in
controversy in the other suits exceeded the jurisdictional limit of the arbitration program).
See Annual Report of the Director of the Administrative Office of the United States
Courts, 1988 191-92 (Table C3), 180 (Table C2).
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played by the "neutral" in the adjudicatory process. Arbitrators in
the Local Rule 500 program play, if anything, slightly more passive
roles than judges. Arbitrators have no case management powers or
responsibilities. Nor are they empowered to define issues, compel
discovery, or rule on motions. At the hearings they are expected to
play a role akin to the model of the traditional passive/reactive
referee. They are likely to set a less formal tone at arbitration
hearings, and to enforce the rules of evidence less rigidly than a
judge would at a trial, but they are not expected to initiate actions
designed to generate evidence or encourage settlement negotia-
tions. In part because they leave these responsibilities in the hands
of counsel, arbitrators are likely to be less interventionist than
many judges. Moreover, because of the limits on their power, their
role, and their prestige, arbitrators are not in a position to alter as
significantly as a judge could the "natural" balance of power be-
tween opposing parties and counsel.
Even though Local Rule 500 arbitration does not divert signifi-
cant judicial resources from traditional adjudicative or settlement
functions, the establishment of alternative dispute resolution pro-
grams can lead to changes in the institutional character of the
courts. These kinds of changes should be sources of concern, how-
ever, only if either (1) the new programs, evaluated on their own,
are undesirable, or (2) they interfere with the court's capacity to
deliver the kind of litigation service it otherwise would be in a po-
sition to deliver. Because other parts of this article attempt to
demonstrate that these programs, on balance, contribute enough to
important ends to make them desirable, the only issue to be ad-
dressed here is whether they interfere with the court's capacity to
deliver traditional litigation services.
While neither ENE nor arbitration divert the time of judges
from other work, both programs consume administrative resources
that the court might use for other purposes. The clerk's office in
the Northern District devotes the equivalent of four full-time posi-
tions to administering these two programs. In addition, one magis-
trate devotes an average of about five hours per week to a set of
responsibilities connected with these programs: (1) responding to
requests to modify application of ENE rules to particular parties
or cases, (2) responding to questions from administrative staff
about whether particular cases meet the criteria for designation to
ENE or arbitration, (3) planning for and conducting training pro-
grams for lawyers who serve as evaluators or arbitrators, (4) pre-
paring and delivering presentations that explain the court's pro-
grams to bar groups and judges' associations, and (5) monitoring
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feedback and preparing reports about how the programs are oper-
ating, then working with judges and members of the task force to
draft proposed changes in the rules that govern ENE and arbitra-
tion. This commitment of time by the magistrate, however, does
not relieve him of any responsibilities the court would impose on
him in the normal course; he bears his full proportionate share of
the traditional civil and criminal work that the court assigns to the
magistrates as a body.
The administrative resources the court commits to the arbitra-
tion and ENE programs do not dilute resources available to the
judges to meet their adjudicative responsibilities. Rather, addi-
tional budget slots have been provided to meet these special ad-
ministrative needs. It seems quite likely that if the arbitration and
ENE programs did not exist, the administrative funding for them
simply would be withdrawn. The court would not be permitted to
keep these staff people for use in traditional functions, in part be-
cause it has been decided that the court already is adequately
staffed to perform those functions.
4. Is There Bias or Discrimination in Determining Which
Cases are Designated for the Arbitration Program?
The arbitration program obviously is not a vehicle for shunt-
ing civil rights cases or habeas corpus petitions out of the judicial
mainstream, since such matters have never been subject to Local
Rule 500.100 Moreover, given the fact that Local Rule 500 reaches
only contract and tort matters, it is not persuasively arguable that
the arbitration program is designed to divert out of the courts any
politically unpopular or sensitive kinds of cases.
If there is any discrimination in the criteria that determine
which cases are compelled to participate in the arbitration pro-
gram it is against traditionally mainstream cases of modest eco-
nomic value. While I acknowledge that many courts have decided
to treat smaller cases differently than larger matters by channel-
ling them into procedures that consume fewer public and private
resources, I do not concede that such decisions, at least as reflected
in the arbitration program in the Northern District, are inspired
by bias or any other untoward motive. In the Northern District,
OO Under the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 1988, federal courts
may not compel a case to participate in local-rule arbitration if the action is "(1) based on
an alleged violation of a right secured by the Constitution of the United States, or (2) if
jurisdiction is based in whole or in part on section 1343 of [title 28 of the U.S. Code]." 28
USC § 652(b) (cited in note 59). Section 1343 grants jurisdiction over cases predicated on
claims arising under certain federal civil rights statues. 28 USC § 1343 (1988).
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the larger cases that meet the subject matter criteria for inclusion
in the arbitration program but that are not designated for that
program because the amount in controversy is too great are subject
to the compulsory jurisdiction of another special program: early
neutral evaluation. Thus, both large and small contract and tort
cases are within the reach of special procedural programs that are
compulsory but nonbinding.
Moreover, in deciding to limit the compulsory jurisdiction of
arbitration under Local Rule 500 to smaller cases, the architects of
the system were motivated not by any hostility toward or impa-
tience with such matters, but by a desire to fashion procedures
that would deliver a better service to them, considering all relevant
measures of value, including quality of deliberative process, cost
and speed. The designers of the arbitration track believed that the
traditional litigation process, with the enormous costs and delays
that accompany it in most urban courts, badly disserves the inter-
ests of litigants of good faith in most smaller cases. Thus, the goal
was to treat smaller cases differently in order to treat them better.
We note that even among lawyers whose clients file demands for
trial de novo after a hearing, the majority view is that the arbitra-
tion program neither delays resolution of the case nor is a waste of
time.101 Thus, it is difficult to argue that arbitration was designed
to impose disproportionate burdens on the classes of cases it
reaches as a means of discouraging the filing of these matters in
the first instance.
5. Does the Arbitration Program Represent a "Second-
Class" Form of Justice?
The results of arbitrations under Local Rule 500 are not bind-
ing, meaning that a party who chooses not to accept an arbitration
award has an unconditional right to trial de novo and thus to the
same class of justice as litigants in cases that are not assigned to
the arbitration track. Moreover, if reliability of result is used as
the primary measure of value, it is arguable that litigants in cases
assigned to the arbitration track have access to a class of justice
that is superior to litigants in cases not designated for arbitration.
Litigants in the arbitration track can choose to take advantage of
two different kinds of dispute resolution proceedings, thus improv-
ing the likelihood that results obtained will be reliable and fair.
101 Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 29 (cited in note 15).
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Since only ten percent of the cases that go through an arbitra-
tion hearing also go through trial, however, it is important to com-
pare the quality of justice delivered by the arbitration track with-
out a trial at the end to the quality of justice delivered by a system
without an arbitration track. Making this comparison is a complex
task. To begin, it is appropriate to ask: if there were no arbitration
track, what would the process consist of by which these cases
would most likely be resolved? Given that they are smaller con-
tract and tort actions, they would most likely be resolved, in the
absence of an arbitration process, through private settlement nego-
tiations, unassisted by the court, after receiving only a modest
amount of pretrial attention from a judge. Most of the cases that
are designated for arbitration also are settled through private ne-
gotiations, and most of these settlements occur before an arbitra-
tion hearing is held.
The only arguably significant difference between the process
that would lead to settlement if there were no arbitration program
and the process for cases subject to Local Rule 500 is that in the
arbitration track earlier deadlines pressure counsel to develop the
information necessary to settle the case more promptly than they
might if their case had to compete for scarce trial dates with crimi-
nal and other civil matters on the assigned judge's docket. That
competition often means two things: (1) dates for trial are not
"firm" (judges often set several matters for the same day, hoping
all but one will settle) and (2) the trial of any given matter is likely
to commence substantially later than an arbitration hearing
would.102 The earlier and firmer dates for the arbitration can move
counsel and parties to negotiate settlements earlier, thus reducing
time to disposition and, presumably, some costs. Attorneys re-
sponding to the most recent federal judicial center questionnaires
believe that in many arbitration cases these effects do in fact oc-
cur: they report that disposing of cases assigned to the arbitration
track consumes less of their time, less of their client's time and
money, and that the imminence of the arbitration event serves as
an impetus to begin settlement discussions."°
lot As noted earlier, the median time between the filing of the complaint and the com-
mencement of an arbitration hearing is about nine months, whereas, for all civil cases, the
median time between the filing of the complaint and the commencement of trial appears to
be at least 18 to 20 months. See txt accompanying notes 59-60.
os Meierhoefer & Seron, ArH.- -ation in the Northern District at 24-25 (cited in note
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Given the pressure to develop the evidence faster for arbitra-
tion cases than for cases not subject to Local Rule 500, one might
fear that the quality of the information base and the reasoning
that supports the earlier settlements might be inferior to the qual-
ity of the information and reasoning that would support settle-
ments reached later. It appears, however, that any such fear would
be largely misplaced. The cases that are assigned to the arbitration
track are not large, not likely to be conceptually dense, and not
likely to turn on novel legal theories. Rather, they are modest-sized
tort and contract cases, the kinds of matters that lawyers can be in
a good position to evaluate reliably in fairly short order. In the
Federal Judicial Center's first three-district survey of lawyers
whose cases terminated prior to the arbitration hearing, only five
percent felt that the "arbitration rule probably caused an overly
hasty settlement of the case."' 0 ' And in the more recent survey
conducted by the Center, 86 percent of the lawyers whose cases
had gone through the hearing stage agreed that there had been ad-
equate time for discovery prior to the hearing. 10 5 Moreover, if the
deadlines in the arbitration track had adverse affects on lawyers'
ability to prepare their cases for disposition, by settlement or oth-
erwise, one would not expect 80 percent of all the responding law-
yers in that same survey to approve of court-annexed arbitration in
general and to support the program as it has been developed in the
Northern District in particular. 106
For the 15 percent of the cases assigned to the arbitration
track that actually reach the hearing stage, questions about the
quality of the arbitration process itself are indisputably significant.
Here again the responses from lawyers who have gone through ar-
bitration hearings in the Northern District are reassuring. Almost
95 percent report having been given adequate time at the hearing
to present all necessary evidence. 10 7 Ninety-three percent agreed
that the procedures were fair, 87 percent agreed that the arbitra-
tors were fair and impartial, and 72 percent reported that the arbi-
trators were prepared for the substantive proceedings.' 8 Among
the parties themselves, support for the quality of the procedure
was comparably solid. Of the parties who responded to the more
10, Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at 64, 80 (cited in note
34).
105 Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 26.
Id at 22.
107 Id at 27. See also Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at 62.
.o Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 26-27 (cited in note
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recent Federal Judicial Center Study, about 90 percent reported
understanding what was taking place, 85 percent felt that the en-
tire process reflected in the arbitration track was fair, an identical
percentage felt that the hearing itself was fair, 82 percent thought
the arbitrators seemed well-prepared, 78 percent felt that the hear-
ing provided a good chance for their side of the story to be told,
and 70 percent believed that all of the important facts had been
brought out at the hearing.'0 9 Only 15 percent felt that the hearing
was a waste of time. 10 While some of these percentages are not
quite as high as one might hope, in the aggregate they represent a
solid endorsement of the arbitration process.
While the Federal Judicial Center has not posed an identical
set of questions to lawyers and litigants about jury and non-jury
trials, its most recent survey did offer its respondents an opportu-
nity to compare the trial and the arbitration processes in some lim-
ited but significant respects. The first set of questions focused on
the perceived quality of decisionmaking. Given four possible re-
sponses-judge, jury, arbitrator, or "makes no differ-
ence"-lawyers were asked who they thought would be most likely
to (1) understand their point of view in this case, (2) come up with
a decision that was fair to everyone, and (3) apply the law cor-
rectly. In response to each of the three questions, more lawyers
chose a judge than any other alternative. The disparity between
the preference for a judge and for either other alternative was by
far the most dramatic in response to the question about applying
the law: 71.6 percent indicated that a judge is most likely to apply
the law correctly, while only 4.6 percent and 4.1 percent selected a
jury or arbitrator, respectively. The remaining respondents, 19.7
percent, opined that there was no difference between judge, jury,
and arbitrator in this respect. The responses to the other two ques-
tions form a similar, though not identical, pattern: about 40 per-
cent of the lawyers believed that judges were most likely to under-
stand their point of view in the case and to come up with a
decision that was fair to everyone, about 30 percent indicated that
there was no difference between a judge, jury, or arbitrator in ei-
ther respect, and the remaining respondents, about 29 percent,
split roughly evenly between those who would have more confi-
dence in a jury and those who would have more confidence in an
arbitrator. Slightly more lawyers felt that a jury was more likely to
understand their point of view-16.9 percent for a jury versus 11.6
"I Id at 35, 38.
11o Id at 38.
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percent for an arbitrator, while, by a very similar margin, slightly
more lawyers believed that an arbitrator was more likely to render
a decision that was fair to everyone-16.0 percent for an arbitrator
versus 11.7 percent for a jury. 1 '
While the pattern in these responses clearly shows that law-
yers have more confidence in the quality of decisionmaking by
judges than by juries or arbitrators, the structure of the question
does not permit us to determine how much greater that confidence
is. If the perceived quality gap between judges and juries or arbi-
trators were quite large, permitting either of the other two kinds of
decisionmakers to play significant roles could be justified only if it
could be shown that using juries or arbitrators contributes much
more than court trials to other significant values. While such show-
ings are possible, the importance of making them is reduced by the
pattern of lawyer responses to another very significant question
posed in the most recent Federal Judicial Center survey. The ques-
tion was: "Considering costs, time, and fairness, would you prefer
to have your case decided by a judge, jury, arbitration, or makes no
difference?" The most commonly made choice, by a considerable
margin, was arbitration. The percentage of responding lawyers who
voiced a preference for arbitration, when all three of these impor-
tant values were considered, jumped to 47.9 percent, while the per-
centage who preferred a court trial fell to 28.5 percent, and the
percentage who would choose a jury trial remained about the same,
at 11.7 percent. The remaining 11.9 percent indicated that it made
no difference which process was used." 2
The pattern in the responses to all four of these questions sug-
gests two intriguing inferences: (1) while there is a difference in
perceived quality of decisionmaking by judges on the one hand
and, on the other hand, by juries and arbitrators, that difference is
not huge, and (2) the modest loss in decisionmaking quality that
occurs when a case proceeds through arbitration instead of court
trial is, in a great many cases, more than compensated for by sig-
nificant savings in time and money. While the opinion data gener-
ated by the Federal Judicial Center are not sufficient to prove ei-
ther of these inferences conclusively, they at least should give
critics of arbitration some pause. Moreover, there is additional
support for these inferences in the fact, already noted, that more
than 80 percent of the surveyed lawyers expressed approval of
.. Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 22-23 (cited in note
11 Id.
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court-annexed arbitration in general and of the program as devel-
oped in the Northern District in particular.11 Presumably this ap-
proval would not be forthcoming if lawyers felt that the arbitration
program, judged by the full range of values relevant to resolving
disputes, was not at least competitive with the trial alternative.
Before considering some other'values by which the arbitration
program might be assessed, it is important to describe one addi-
tional set of data that sheds a little additional light on questions
about whether there is a significant loss of decisionmaking quality
when arbitration is used instead of trial. We are in a position to
compare the result of the arbitration hearing to the result after
trial for the 62 cases in the Northern District in which there has
been, through August 1, 1989, both an arbitration hearing and a
subsequent trial de novo. While this limited data bas11 is not
large enough to support any firm conclusions, it is sufficiently in-
teresting to warrant a brief description here.
Of the parties who requested trial de novo after an arbitration
hearing, slightly more than half, 33 out of 63, or 52 percent, se-
cured a more favorable result at trial.1 5 Only 22 of these parties,
35 percent of those demanding trial, however, improved their posi-
tion by more than $10,000. If we assume that it was likely to cost
$10,000 or more to move the case from the arbitration through a
final judgment after trial, it follows that approximately two-thirds
of the parties who demanded trial de novo failed to improve their
position by a sufficient margin to have made the trial worthwhile.
It also is significant that only ten parties, 16 percent, improved
their position by more than $25,000. Moreover, for 13, 21 percent,
of the parties who made de novo demands, the judgment after trial
was less favorable than the arbitration award, and for five of these
parties the result after trial was less favorable by a margin of
$25,000 or more.
Comparing results at trial to arbitration awards from a slightly
different perspective yields interesting, even though inconclusive,
data about the reliability of arbitrations under Local Rule 500 as
predictors of likely outcome at trial. In 35 of the 62 cases-56 per-
cent-the difference between the arbitration award and the result
M3 Id at 22.
.. The data discussed in this section have been developed by Lee Derin, Martha
Soeldner and the author for this Article.
" While 62 arbitration cases went to trial, 63 parties made demands for trial de novo;
in one case two parties demanded trial, one of whom improved its position considerably and
the other of whom ended up considerably worse off after trial.
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after trial was less than $10,000. In 49 of the 62 cases-79 per-
cent-the difference between arbitration and trial was $25,000 or
less. Whether these figures are viewed as a glass half-full or half-
empty may depend on the predilections of the observer,, but I be-
lieve that the fact that a subsequent trial produced a significantly
different result " in only about one-third of these cases is positive
evidence about the reliability of arbitration awards. The strength
of this inference grows when we focus on the nature of the cases
that make up the small group that goes all the way to judgment
after trial. The one to two percent of the matters that survive
through the trial stage obviously are the most resistant to consen-
sual resolution; as such, they may be the most difficult to analyze
or predict, and may include a disproportionate number of "close"
evidentiary and legal questions. If the cases that survive to the
trial stage have these characteristics, they represent a skewed sam-
ple from which it might not be fair to draw negative inferences
about the relative reliability of the arbitration process.
On the other hand, it is important to acknowledge that in
eight of the 62 cases-13 percent-the difference between the re-
sult after trial and the result after arbitration was $50,000 or more,
and that in three of these matters the difference exceeded
$130,000.117 Of the eight cases in which the difference between ar-
bitration and trial exceeded $50,000, six were tried to the court
and two were tried to a jury. These figures are disquieting, but do
not necessarily indict the arbitration process. We do not know
enough about these cases to determine what accounts for these dis-
parities; it is conceivable, for example, that the outcome at trial
was less rational than the result of the arbitration hearing. More-
over, in these eight cases, the number of months that elapsed be-
tween the arbitration and the trial ranged from five to 53; in four
of the cases the arbitration and the trial were separated by five or
six months, but in the other four cases more than a year elapsed
between the two events. The passage of time between the two pro-
ceedings obviously gives rise to the possibility that significant new
"1 Defining "significant" in this context is an elusive exercise; in deciding whether to
attach this label I have taken into account not only the absolute dollars separating the arbi-
tration award from the judgment after trial, but also the size of the case. Thus, in two
matters where the amounts in controversy were large, I deemed differences of about $40,000
insignificant, whereas I deemed differences of less than $25,000 "significant" in other cases
where the amount in controversy was much less.
17 In one case the difference was $135,000, in another the difference was $150,000, and
in the third the difference was $352,000.
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evidence was discovered after the arbitration hearing, or that the
damages suffered by the plaintiff increased substantially.
It does not seem likely, however, that factors like the passage
of time fully account for the large disparities in outcome in these
eight cases. Rather, it is virtually inevitable that a program that
draws arbitrators from a pool of more than two hundred private
attorneys will produce some arbitration awards that are supported
by clearly erroneous reasoning. The quality control in the process
of selecting and training a large number of evaluators is not likely
to be as good as it is in most processes that lead to judicial ap-
pointments, even though the latter are encumbered by political
considerations that play no role in the former.
A pattern of great disparities between arbitration awards and
results at trial, regardless of its cause, would seriously compromise
one of the putative values of an arbitration: to equip parties to
predict more reliably what is likely to happen if the case is tried to
judgment. Thus, such disparities would provoke serious concern if
they' occurred in a significant percentage of cases. Fortunately,
large variations between arbitration awards and results after trial
are the exception rather than the rule.
As noted earlier, reliability of result is by no means the only
measure of value by which the arbitration process should be as-
sessed. In addition to saving clients money and expediting resolu-
tion of their cases, most lawyers believe that arbitrations under the
Local Rule are useful for clarifying issues and for disclosing the
relative strengths and weaknesses of the parties' positions in ways
that contribute to the settlement dynamic. " 8 Moreover, most of
the parties who responded to the recent Federal Judicial Center
survey indicated that an arbitration would be a "more comfortable
setting" than a trial, and that it would be less formal and easier to
understand.11 9 Given these feelings about arbitration hearings, the
parties are more likely to play a participatory role in them and less
likely to feel alienated by them. In addition, the less formal, more
comfortable setting is likely to cause parties less stress than a trial,
is less likely to inspire them to assume confrontational postures
toward one another, and is more likely to encourage parties to
communicate constructively about their dispute. Finally, arbitra-
tions under Local Rule 500 offer greater protection to the parties'
privacy interests than trials. The arbitrations usually take place in
"' Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 29 (cited in note 15);
Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-Annexed Arbitration at 66 (cited in note 34).
"' Meierhoefer & Seron, Arbitration in the Northern District at 39.
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the offices of the arbitrator, are not announced publicly, and are
attended only by the parties, witnesses and counsel. And arbitra-
tion awards need not become public documents, even if the parties
use them as a basis for settlement-the parties can demand trial
de novo, thus leaving the award sealed, but agree to settle their
case on terms identical to those in the award.
In sum, even if the results of arbitrations are not quite as reli-
able as the results of court trials, the fact that the arbitration pro-
cess contributes more than the trial process to such a long list of
important values makes it difficult to conclude that the arbitration
program represents a "second class" form of justice.
CONCLUSION
This article has not shown that any one of these three court-
sponsored ADR programs is perfect. No human institution is per-
fect. No one would argue that trials are perfect. Rather, what I
have tried to show is that none of these imperfect programs is seri-
ously vulnerable to criticisms that have been articulated of court-
sponsored ADR programs in general, and that each of these pro-
grams offers significant benefits to litigants without causing serious
harm to competing interests. In the vast majority of cases, the par-
ties whose cases go through one of these programs are appreciably
better off than they would be if the program did not exist. Mea-
sured by the full range of relevant values, each program is a genu-
inely constructive force in the dispute resolution process.
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